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COERCING CLIENTS: CAN LAWYER
GATEKEEPER RULES WORK)
FRED C. ZACHARIAS *
Abstract: Recent federal regulations and amendments to the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct—most of which have responded to
lawyer involvement in corporate scandals—rest on the assumption that
lawyers have a role to play in forcing clients to act legally, morally, or
appropriately. Lawyers are distinctive, perhaps even unique among
professionals, in that they are sometimes legally authorized to force
clients into obeying the lawyers' advice. This Article reviews the rules
that empower lawyers in this way, with a focus on the corporate context.
For the most part, the recent regulatory changes take a static view of
the lawyer-client relationship. They assume that if lawyers are authorized
or required to counteract proposed client misconduct, lawyers will do so
and less client misconduct will result. This Article demonstrates that the
reality is far more complex. Lawyers and clients have incentives to
implement coercive rules in ways that serve reasons wholly unrelated to
the rules' purposes. Code drafters and those evaluating lawyers'
coercive authority, therefore, must confront the fact that attorney-client
relationships are dynamic—that is, that a change in the power of one
party in the relationship has ripple effects. This practical reality
influences both the positions of lawyers in deciding whether to favor or
oppose particular regulation and the likely effectiveness of coercive
rules.
INTRODUCTION
The allocation of power in the attorney-client relationship is dis-
tinctive. Like most service providers, lawyers are employees, agents, or
independent contractors. They typically must do their clients' bid-
ding) Like other professionals, lawyers also have special expertise that
* Herzog Endowed Research Professor, University of San Diego School of Law. The
Author thanks Professors Bruce Green, Shaun Martin, and David McGowan for their
thoughtfill comments on earlier drafts of this Article; Siraj Bayaan, Brian Katusian, and
Ryan Keller for their research assistance; and the University of San Diego School of Law
for its generous research support.
I See, e.g., MODEL RULES or PROWL CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2002) (staling that "a lawyer
shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation and ... shall
consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued"); MODEL RULES OF
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456	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 47:455
often leads clients to defer to their recommendations. 2 Lawyers, how-
ever, are unusual in the degree of control they exercise within the re-
lationship. Unlike in medical decision making, for example, some le-
gal decisions arc for lawyers, and lawyers alone, to makes Other
professionals may he able to influence those who hire them, but law-
yers have legally recognized authority to pressure clients into accept-
ing their advice—particularly when that advice concerns illegal or
wrongful conduct.
I do not mean to overstate the case. Lawyers do not always have
coercive authority. Nor do the professional codes explicitly sanction
pressure on clients. Nevertheless, the codes do envision lawyers using
their position to persuade,4
 and sometimes force, clients to act in ac-
cordance with the lawyers' view of appropriate conduct. 5 In other in-
stances, the codes simply give lawyers authority to override clients'
commands.6
Lawyers can exercise coercive power in a variety of ways. They
may threaten to resign when clients do not conform to their advice.
Lawyers may insist upon particular legal tactics. And, through the co-
ercive mechanism that is most commonly discussed in the literature,
lawyers sometimes have the right to reveal otherwise confidential in-
formation about the client. Threatening a revelation typically forces
the client to act as the lawyer wishes.
PROF'L CoNoucr R. 1.2(a) (1983) (same); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-7
(1969) (noting that "the authority to make decisions is exclusively that of the client"); cf.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. (2002) (clarifying that "this Rule does not
prescribe how ... disagreements [about the means] are to be resolved").
2 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNoucr R. 1.2 cmt. (2002) (stating that "Hlients
normally defer to the special knowledge and skill of their lawyer with respect to the means
to be used to accomplish their objectives").
See MODEL RULES or PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 con. (1983) (stating "a lawyer is not re-
quired to pursue objectives or employ means simply because a client may wish that the
lawyer do so").
See MODEL RULES OF PROF'', CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2002) (allowing lawyers to advise cli-
ents concerning the moral and political ramifications of their conduct); see also Upjohn
Co. v. United States, 949 U.S. 383, 392 (1981) (characterizing promoting clients' "compli-
ance with the law" as one of the key justifications for giving lawyers the ability to obtain
privileged information from clients); Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 Iowa
L. REV. 351, 369 (1989) (describing the law compliance rationale for attorney-client
confidentiality).
5 See infra notes 29-92 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT It 3.3(a) (3) (2002) (giving lawyers dis-
cretion not to use evidence they believe to be false); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
1.2 cmt. (1983) (assigning lawyers control over the means of litigation).
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Consider this ability of lawyers to use confidences to pressure cli-
ents. Legal ethics codes always have made some provision for disclo-
sure. 7 Spurred by public reaction to lawyer involvement in recent cor-
porate scandals, 8 the American Bar Association (the "ABA") adopted
amendments to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct in 2002 and
2003 that make explicit an expanded right of attorneys, especially
corporate attorneys, to reveal or threaten to reveal information. 9 Ad-
7 E.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF1, CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2002); MODEL RULES OF PROF'I,
CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (1983); MoDEL CODE or PRor'L REsroms RILITY DR 4-101 (C) (1969).
8 Seep] E. Fisch & Kenneth M. Rosen, Is There a Role for Lawyers in Preventing Future En-
tons?, 48 Vol.. L. REV. 1097, 1099 (2003) (describing how lawyers' mishaps in the Enron
debacle invited scrutiny of lawyers in corporate governance); Peter C. Kostant, Sarbanes-
Oxley and Changing the Norms Corporate Lauyering, 2004 MIC11. Si. L. Rev. 541, 542 (noting
the lack of effective gatekeeping by lawyers in the Enron scandal); Samantha Abuja, Note,
What Do I Do Now? A Lawyer's Duty Post-Sarhanes-Oxley, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 1263, 1263-64
(2004) (recounting how lawyers and other professionals were thrust into the spotlight chic
to the events at WorldCom, Tyco, and Enron); Cf. FRANK PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED:
HOW DECEIT AND RISK CORRUPTED THE FINANCIAL MARKETS 331 (2003) (demonstrating
outside counsel's involvement in the Enron scandal).
9 See Monet, RULES OF PROCL CONDUCT R. 1.6(b), 1.13(b) (2002). The revised Model
Rule 1.6(b) provides, in pertinent part:
(h) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client
to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm;
(2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is rea-
sonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or
property of another and in furtherance of which the client has used or is
using the lawyer's services;
(3) to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial inter-
ests or property of another that is reasonably certain to result or has re-
sulted from the client's commission of a crime or fraud in furtherance of
which the client has used the lawyer's services ....
MODEL RULES OF PROF . ', CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2002). The revised Model Rule 1.13 pro-
vides, in pertinent part:
(b) If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or other
person associated with the organization is engaged in action, intends to act or
refuses to act in a matter related to the representation that is a violation of a
legal obligation to the organization, or a violation of law that reasonably
might be imputed to the organization, and that is likely to result in substantial
injury to the organization, then the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably nec-
essary in the best interest of the organization. Unless the lawyer reasonably
believes that it is not necessary in the best interest of the organization to do
so, the lawyer shall refer the matter to higher authority in the organization,
including, if warranted by the circumstances to the highest authority that can
act on behalf of the organization as determined by applicable law.
(c) Except as provided in Paragraph (d), if
(1) despite the lawyer's efforts in accordance with paragraph (b) the
highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization insists upon or
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ministrative regulations implementing the federal Sarbancs-Oxley Act
render mandatory some attorney disclosures of corporate miscon-
duct. 0 Pending regulations propose additional requirements."
One interpretation of these provisions is that society expects law-
yers to reveal corporate clients' misconduct on a routine basis. 12 A
second interpretation is that the ability to disclose should only be ex-
ercised rarely, but that a disclosure rule provides lawyers with a tool
they can use to persuade clients to act properly.' 3 Strict proponents of
attorney-client confidentiality characterize the process by which law-
yers force clients to amend their conduct at pain of exposure as a
fails to address in a timely and appropriate manner an action, or a refusal
to act, that is clearly a violation of law, and
(2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the violation is reasonably certain
to result in substantial injury to the organization,
then the lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation
whether or not Rule 1.6 permits such disclosure, but only if to the extent
the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent substantial injury to the
organization.
MODEL Ruus or PRO 'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2002).
10 See 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b) (2005). Under this provision, lawyers who become aware .
that a material violation of securities law or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by
the company or any agent thereof is reasonably likely must notify the chief executive
officer or chief legal officer. lf the attorney does not obtain an appropriate response, the
attorney must report the violation to an audit committee or the hoard of directors. At this
stage, a failure of the highest authority to correct a violative securities filing only triggers
permissive authority to disclose the violation to the SEC. Id. § 205.3(d) (2).
II Under a proposed SEC regulation, a lawyer who does not receive an appropriate re-
sponse from a corporate client regarding her report of a securities violation or breach of
fiduciary obligation to the company must cease representing the company with respect to
the company's securities filings and notify the SEC of her withdrawal for "professional
considerations." See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys,
67 Fed. Reg. 71,670, 71,706 (Dec. 2, 2002), quoted in 68 Fed. Reg. 6324, 6324 [hereinafter
"Proposed SEC Noisy Withdrawal Rule"] (noting deferral of the proposal). For a full dis-
cussion of the actual and proposed SEG regulations, see generally Roger Cramton et al.,
Legal and Ethical Duties of Lawyers After Sarbanes-Oxley, 49 Vit.L. L. REv. 725 (2004) and Fisch
& Rosen, supra note 8.
12 See David McGowan, Why Not Try the Carrot? A Modest Proposal to Grant Immunity to
Lawyers Who Disclose Client Financial Misconduct, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1825, 1825 (2004) (assum-
ing that it is desirable for lawyers to use their authority to disclose "financial scams").
13 See William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1083, 1 142
n.129 (1988) (arguing that the lawyers' authority to disclose provides them with appropri-
ate leverage in convincing clients to pursue good conduct). See generally Fred C. Zacharias,
Lawyers as Gatekeepers, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1387 (2004) (discussing lawyers' role in en-
couraging appropriate client conduct and the function disclosure exceptions play in rein-
forcing that role).
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form of extortion that undermines the very notion of an attorney-
client trust relationship."
For the most part, that is as far as the analysis has proceeded.
Proponents argue that allowing or requiring lawyers to disclose future
client misconduct benefits society and lawyers' ability to act as moral
individuals, 15 while opponents argue that it undermines the adversary
system and client autonomy. 16 Commentators treat the issue as a static
question of whose interests should control.
This Article suggests that disclosure exceptions, as well as other
professional regulations that enable lawyers to coerce clients into act-
ing "appropriately," need to be analyzed in greater depth. 17 The prac-
PI See, e.g., Monroe H. Freedman, Ethical Ends and Ethical Means, 411 LEGAL EDUC. 55,
57-58 (1991) (arguing that lawyers should not be able to "blackmail" clients into acting
morally); Panel Discussion, A Gathering of Legal Scholars to Discuss "Professional Responsibility
and The Model Rules of Professional Conduct," 35 U. MIAMI L. REv. 639, 647 (1981) ("Hit has
been correctly pointed out that the lawyer's real control, and this has been stated candidly
by those who support the power of the lawyer to blow the whistle, is blackmail. 'Do it my
way' is the only alternative offered a client.") (comments of Monroe Freedman); Jamie G.
Heller, Note, Legal Counseling in the Administrative State: How to Let the Client Decide, 103 YALE
U. 2503, 2511, 2515-18 (1994) (comparing models that expect lawyers to accord clients
decision-making autonomy with models that expect lawyers to strong-arm clients into ad-
hering to legal requirements).
15 See, e.g., WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE 56, 166 (1998) (arguing that
a lawyer who becomes "insensitive to the moral costs of actions she feels she must take risks
losing her capacity to assess such costs in situations where she has greater discretion");
Fred C. Zacharias, Harmonizing Privilege and Confidentiality, 41 S. TEx. L. REV. 69, 69 n.3
(1999) (identifying proponents of confidentiality exceptions).
16 See, e.g., MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABRE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS
45-69 (3d ed. 2004) (discussing the importance of client autonomy in assessing whether
the lawyer has a right to impose "virtue" on the client); Zacharias, supra note 4, at 358-60
nn.29-38 (identifying proponents of strict confidentiality).
17 In an interesting recent article, David McGowan is among the first to acknowledge
the importance of addressing "the costs disclosure [to prevent client wrongdoing] creates
for lawyers who blow the whistle." McGowan, supra note 12, at 1825. Based on his assess-
ment of lawyers' incentives, he concludes that discretionary disclosure rules such as those
contained in recent amendments to Model Rules 1.6 and 1.13 "are unlikely to change
actual practice very much." Id. at 1825-26.
Professor McGowan confines himself to lawyer disclosure, as opposed to other mecha-
nisms of coercion designed to promote appropriate client behavior that this Article ad-
dresses. For purposes of his analysis, he assumes that the code drafters actually intend (or
desire) corporate lawyers to reveal client misconduct as a routine and that disclosure is the
societal benefit that the rules seek to produce. Id. He therefore considers the disclosure
scenario statically, or two dimensionally. In other words, the only possible outcomes for
lawyers are to disclose and bear the costs or not disclose and assume the economic risk of
the possibility that the illegality later will be uncovered. Id. at 1827-28. This paradigm leads
McGowan to consider mainly the immediate economic consequences, or likely conse-
quences, of disclosure (for example, at the moment after disclosure), without addressing
460	 Boston College Law Review
	
[Vol. 47:455
ticalities of attorney-client relationships cannot be reduced to a single
paradigm. As professional rules enhance lawyers' power over clients,
clients are given reasons to distance themselves from lawyers. Lawyers,
in turn, may enjoy their increased status, but may prefer to work to
maintain or regain the previous relationship.
Changes in the rules thus have a dynamic, rather than a static, ef-
fect. Systemically, according lawyers coercive power may be designed to
produce one consequence (for example, the public revelation of client
misconduct), but in the long run may achieve different (and perhaps
counter-productive) consequences for lawyers, clients, and society by
changing the interplay of the participants in the attorney-client rela-
tionship. On an individual basis, lawyers' personal incentives will affect
how they use the power that the rules give them. Whether and how
lawyers exercise coercive power probably depends on context far more
than participants in the debates thus far have acknowledged.
This Article attempts to further the discussion by scrutinizing the
process of lawyer coercion—including what might loosely be termed
"attorney blackmail"—and considering its likely effects on lawyers and
clients. Threats of disclosure, resignation, or other consequences cli-
ents consider unpleasant usually do not constitute blackmail in the
strict legal sense. Because the lawyer who coerces a client ordinarily
does not obtain personal benefits when the client submits, 18 and be-
cause the lawyer typically demands a client response that the lawyer
(or society) has a right to expect' 9 or that the lawyer has a right to
psychological, relational, and status concerns or nuances in how different lawyers and
clients will respond to variations in the rules. Id. at 1827-33.
19 Under the Model Penal Code, the crime of blackmail is a form of theft, and is lim-
ited to situations in which the blackmailer "obtains property of another" by the use of a
threat of disclosure. MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.4 (1980); see, e.g., N.H. Rev. STAT. ANN.
§ 637:1 (1955) (noting that theft represents a single offense and incorporates blackmail);
UTAII CODE ANN. § 76-6-403 (1953) (stating that blackmail is a form of theft); Rael v. Sulli-
van, 918 F.2d 874, 876 n.1 (10th Cir. 1990) (quoting 31A AM. JUR. 2u Extortion § 49 as stat-
ing: "Under the common law and most recent statutory codes and proposals, extortion by
a private person, or blackmail, is limited to obtaining property ...."); State v. Talley, 466
A.2d 78, 81 (N.J. 1983) (referencing the Model Penal Code and noting theft crimes that
involve the involuntary transfer of property). A definition limiting the blackmailer's poten-
tial benefit to "property," however, may be too constrained. See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
CRIMINAL LAW § 20.4(a), at 1014 (4th ed. 2003) (noting broader statutes that encompass
"'pecuniary advantage' or 'anything of value' or the like" or "'any act against the victim's]
will'"); Leo Katz, Blackmail and Other Forms of Arm-Twisting, 141 U. PA. L. Rev. 1567, 1568
(1993) (noting that "]i] t is also easy, but also wrong, to think that blackmail is essentially a
property crime" and providing counter-examples).
19 The issue of whether it is improper for a "blackmailer" to extort a socially beneficial
result—even legally required conduct—is complex. See, e.g., LAFAVE, supra note 18,
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produce herself, 2° the lawyer's threats may not be subject to criminal
prosecution. Nevertheless, this Article refers to such coercion as "at-
torney blackmail" and rules that authorize coercion as "blackmail
rules" because those terms best encapsulate the process envisioned by
the rules: lawyers are given (and sometimes exercise) power to coerce
an involuntary surrender of clients' traditional authority to dictate
terms and control the subject of representation."
Part I identifies the ways in which lawyer coercion may occur in
the corporate context. 22 Part II considers when corporate lawyers
would (or would not) want the ability to force clients to change their
behavior and lawyers' incentives (and disincentives) to implement the
option of making coercive threats. 23 Part III notes the ramifications of
these countervailing considerations for the conduct of lawyers and
clients, particularly corporate clients."
Part IV demonstrates that, to the extent it is in society's interest
to authorize or require attorneys to pressure clients under some cir-
§ 20.4(a), at 1015-16 (discussing cases and statutes suggesting that an "intent to gain" is
not always a requirement or blackmail); Mitchell N. Berman, The Evidentiary Theory of
Blackmail: Taking Motives Seriously, 65 U. Ctn. L, REV. 795, 864-65 (1998) (discussing the
issue of' "whether blackmail should be criminalized when the blackmailer's ostensible ob-
jective is a public, rather than private, good"); Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Blackmail as Private
Justice, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1935, 1936 (1993) (arguing that blackmail based on incriminat-
ing information is "potentially paradoxical because it might confer social benefits not pro-
duced by other kinds of blackmail"); Russell Hardin, Blackmailing for Mutual Good, 141 U.
PA. L. REV. 1787, 1790-92 (1993) (analyzing the argument that plea bargaining and other
forms of coercion designed to extract a good result are ordinary, or morally justified,
blackmail).
2° One example of this occurs when a lawyer forces the client to reveal wrongdoing
that the lawyer has a legal right to reveal herself. See Scott Altman, A Patchwork Theory of
Blackmail, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1639, 1639 n.2 (1993) (discussing, inter ilia, why it is wrong to
place a condition on doing an optional act); Berman, supra note 19, at 796 (analyzing the
"so-called paradox of blackmail" that offering to refrain from revealing embarrassing in-
formation that one has a right to reveal (or not reveal) may become unlawful if offered in
exchange for payment); Wendy J. Gordon, Truth and Consequences: The Force of Blackmails
Central Case, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1741, 1743 (1993) (justifying blackmail law in "paradox"
cases on the basis that "people do not invariably have a right to threaten to do or not do
the things they are at liberty to do or not do"); Katz, supra note 18, at 1568 (discussing
examples in which legal objectives may become illegal when offered in exchanged for
money); James Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradox of Blackmail, 84 COLUM. L REV. 670, 670-
71 (1984) (highlighting the complexity of the paradox).
si Cf. Peter J. Henning, Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 307 and Corporate. Counsel: Who Better to Pre-
vent Corporate Crime?, 8 Bum Cum. L. Ray. 323, 328 (2004) (stating that a mandatory
withdrawal rule may enable lawyers to "use the withdrawal requirement strategically to
force the corporation to accede to the lawyer's demand, i.e., blackmail").
22 See infra notes 29-42 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 43-68 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 69-110 and accompanying text.
462	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 47:455
cumstances, that conclusion results from a balance of competing fac-
tors. 25 The professional rules, however, tend to rely on shorthand
methods to implement the balance. Corporations and lawyers may
favor or oppose rules supporting coercion for reasons relating to their
personal incentives, having nothing whatsoever to do with the valid
concerns underlying the rules. Lawyers also may implement the rules
in ways that undermine the achievement of the rulemakers' goals.
The Article's analysis therefore helps explain why segments of the
bar take certain positions in the debates concerning, for example, rules
allowing disclosure or threatening disclosure of confidential informa-
tion. Understanding the personal costs and benefits of coercive author-
ity to attorneys informs the objective analysis of when society should
wish to authorize attorney blackmail. Recognizing that the effects of
granting coercive authority are dynamic also may help determine
whether blackmail provisions should take permissive or mandatory
forms. It may enable rulemakers to craft the provisions in ways that best
provide incentives for appropriate long-term attorney conduct.
This Article is concerned with all forms of attorney coercion and
all contexts in which it occurs. But because most of the recent regula-
tory developments have focused on issues relating in some way to the
revelation of client information—for example, confidentiality excep-
tions or reporting requirements—and have involved the corporate
context, this Article does so as well. The main body of this Article lim-
its itself to situations in which in-house or external corporate counsel
might be inclined to threaten action if her client does not reconsider
proposed conduct. 26
The situation of criminal defendants raises distinct issues, as does
the circumstance in which lawyers develop close trust relationships
with individual, sometimes unsophisticated, clients. 27 Therefore, this
25 See infra notes 111-138 and accompanying text.
26
 To avoid coninsion, this Article will refer to lawyers as female and other actors as
male.
27 Criminal defendants may have special constitutional rights that encompass more of
a right to be free from lawyer blackmail. See Whiteside v. Scurr, 744 F.2d 1323,1328 (8th
Cir. 1984) (holding that a lawyer's threat to impeach a client if he perjured himself un-
dermined the attorney-client trust relationship and therefore constituted ineffective assis-
tance of counsel), reo'd sub nom. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986). As a theoretical
matter, because of the threatening context in which criminal representation occurs, there
may be special reason to assure criminal clients counsel who are independent of the state.
Arguably, many of the same justifications apply to other clients who are especially depend-
ent on their lawyers or unable to navigate the legal system without their direction. See
Sonos, supra note 15, at 170-94 (analyzing the question is Criminal Defense Different?");
Fred C. Zacharias, The Civil-Criminal Distinction in Professional Responsibility, 7 J. CONTEMP.
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Article initially sets those contexts to the side. Part V, however, offers
some thoughts about the degree to which this Article's analysis applies
to non-corporate settings and to different techniques of lawyer coer-
cion .28
I. ATTORNEY COERCION IN THE CORPORATE CONTEXT
Rules governing corporate lawyers' obligations typically refer to
their targets as lawyers representing an organization. By their terms,
the rules apply equally to in-house and external counsel. The incen-
tives of the various corporate lawyers implementing the rules often
differ, however, as do the methods by which they can (or arc expected
to) influence corporate conduct.
Corporate attorneys come in many different forms. In-house coun-
sel ordinarily are salaried employees and have the organization as their
sole client. In-house counsel may themselves be officers or supervisory
personnel (for example, the general counsel), or they may be lower-
level staff. The functions of some in-house counsel are limited to ad-
dressing legal issues. Other in-house lawyers perform dual "legal" and
"business" roles.
In contrast, external counsel typically confine their activities to
legal representation. They may have multiple clients, corporate or oth-
erwise. The client organization in question may constitute large or
small portions of their practice.
When a corporate attorney learns of proposed corporate conduct
or conduct by corporate employees that conflicts with her advice and
that she believes is illegal, improper, or unwise, the professional rules
provide several possible avenues through which the lawyer can attempt
to persuade the client to change its plans. Under Model Rule 1.13:
If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, em-
ployee or other person associated with the organization is
engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act in a matter
related to the representation that is a violation of a legal oh-
ligation to the organization, or a violation of law that rea-
sonably might be imputed to the organization, and that is
likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, then
LEGAL ISSUES 165, 167-78 (1996) (questioning the uniqueness of criminal representation
for purposes of the lawyer's role).
28 See info note 139-156 and accompanying text.
29 See MODEL Runes	 PROE'l, CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2002) (addressing the "organization
as client").
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the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the
best interests of the organization."
Let us suppose that a corporate lawyer deems it necessary that her
client's course of conduct change, but the officer with whom the lawyer
is dealing demurs—for personal reasons or because the officer believes
the corporation would benefit from rejecting the lawyer's advice. In this
instance, the lawyer can threaten a variety of steps short of revealing
information to persons outside the corporation that might influence
the officer to comply. Model Rule L13 authorizes the lawyer to inform
a higher authority within the organization.3 ' Depending on the lawyer's
status within the organization, that may be an easy step for her to take,
or it may risk her employment. 32 Alternatively, the lawyer may inform a
committee established within the organization charged with supervis-
ing law compliance." Or she may withdraw from representing the cor-
poration in the matterm—a dramatic step for in-house counsel because
it is tantamount to resignation from her sole employment" and may or
may not exert significant influence on the client. 36
3° Id. at R. 1 3(b); cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (1983) (requiring
the lawyer to take some remedial steps, but leaving the remedy to the lawyer's discretion).
31
 MODEL RULES OF PROCL CONDUCT R. 1 .13(b) (2002).
52 For example, a general counsel who is an officer of the corporation and questions
the proposed actions of a lower-level employee may find it easy to raise the matter with the
employee's superiors. In contrast,.a staff attorney faced with misconduct by a corporate
vice-president may feel significantly intimidated by the prospect of challenging the vice-
president's conclusions to higher-ups.
33 Under the Sarbanes-Oxley regulations, for example, lawyers can sometimes obviate
their own ethical responsibilities by informing an audit committee or a "qualified legal
compliance committee" established for the purpose of evaluating disagreements about the
propriety of the corporation's conduct. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 205.3(b) (4), 205.3(c) (1) (2005)
(stating that an attorney has fully satisfied her obligation if site reports a violation to a
qualified legal compliance committee).
" See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b) (2002) (authorizing lawyers to
withdraw when a client insists upon pursuing "repugnant" conduct); MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b) (3) (1983) (allowing attorney withdrawal based on "impru-
dent" client conduct).
95 See Stephen M. Bainbridge ,Sc Christina J. Johnson, Managerialism, Legal Ethics, and
Sarbanes-Oxley Section 30Z 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 299, 307 (arguing that the need of' in-
house counsel to please management will cause counsel to avoid pursuing management
wrongdoing).
" In other words, a corporation may not care if a particular lawyer resigns, especially
when another equally qualified (but presumably more pliable) lawyer will take her place at
no significant cost to the client. On the other hand, when a client has invested heavily in
having one lawyer represent it, and substitution of counsel cannot be accomplished
cheaply (or without substantial delay), then the client must balance the costs of losing the
lawyer against the costs of following her advice.
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Under some circumstances, counsel can up the ante. A mild
step—one which enables in-house counsel to pass the buck somewhat
or to enlist support for her opinion—is to suggest that the corporation
seek an independent legal opinion." More forcefully, the lawyer can
effectively require management to seek such an opinion, or to conduct
an internal investigation, by issuing her own opinion stating that pro-
posed conduct would breach management's and the board of direc-
tors' fiduciary duties. 39 Proposed regulations under the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act sometimes would also authorize the lawyer to exercise a "noisy
withdrawal," under which she resigns and disavows documents that rep-
resent or incorporate the improper conduct to an adversary, regulatory
agency, or court 39 In the few circumstances in which a direct exception
to confidentiality applies, the attorney may threaten to expose the cli-
ent's misconduct if the client does not accept her counsel."
Significantly, because of the context in which they offer represen-
tation, corporate counsel have a broader range of remedial options
than lawyers confronting similar misconduct by individual clients. Law-
97 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'1, CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2) (1983) (listing the option of
"advising that a separate legal opinion on the matter be sought for presentation to appro-
priate authority in the organization").
38 When counsel issues such an opinion, even a CEO who intentionally plans to en-
gage in questionable behavior would hesitate to proceed, because his defenses in a poten-
tial shareholder derivative or other suit may become limited and the board of directors
similarly will be less likely to ratify his conduct. See A. Gilchrist Sparks, Ill & John F. Cross-
bauer, The Business Judgment hula and Opinions of Counsel, in CORP. LAW 1987, at 756-58
(PL1 Corporate Law Practice, Course Handbook Series No. B4-6813, 1987) (discussing the
role of attorneys in advising corporate officers whether their conduct is likely to satisfy the
business judgment rule). At a minimum, therelbre, the CEO must take steps to obtain a
second opinion that counteracts the effects of counsel's initiative.
A similar process can occur in situations in which a corporation needs a favorable opin-
ion of counsel in order to proceed with a legal filing or transaction. By withholding, or
threatening to withhold, the opinion, counsel sometimes can force the client to amend its
proposed course of conduct or, at a minimum, to seek a legal opinion from new counsel.
" Proposed SEC Noisy Withdrawal Rule, .supra note 11, at 71,706, quoted in 68 Fed.
Reg. 6324, 6326 (allowing lawyer to notify the SEC of her withdrawal fir "professional
considerations" and to disaffirm documents that are "false and misleading"); rf. Patrick H.
Pugh, Note, The SEC Standards of Professional Responsibility for Attorneys: A Balanced Solution to
Noisy Withdrawal, 14 KAN. j.L. & Pun. POL'Y 659, 672-79 (2005) (suggesting an alternative
SEC noisy withdrawal rule).
40 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(c) (2002) (allowing a lawyer some-
times to reveal information when doing so will "prevent substantial injury to the organiza-
tion"); see also 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2) (2005) (providing that a lawyer may reveal
confidential information to the Commission without the client's consent to the extent the
lawyer reasonably believes necessary "No prevent the issuer from committing a material
violation that is likely to cause substantial injury to the financial interest or property of the
issuer or investors," to prevent perjury, or to rectify the consequences of certain wrongdo-
ing in furtherance of which the lawyer's services were used),
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yers for individuals essentially can only attempt to exert influence,
withdraw, employ a noisy withdrawal when authorized to do so, 41 or dis-
close if confidentiality exceptions permit. In most circumstances, noisy
withdrawal is tantamount to disclosing the impropriety. 42 Threatening
either disclosure or noisy withdrawal is likely to carry significant weight
and is likely to succeed in blackmailing compliance. The silent with-
drawal alternative will be effective only when the client either places
significant trust in this attorney or fears proceeding with new counsel.
U. CORPORATE LAWYERS' INCENTIVES
In sorting out the reasons why lawyers would desire, or not desire,
the power to force clients to accept legal advice, it is important to rec-
ognize that short- and long-term incentives differ. Threatening disclo-
sure, for example, may enhance a lawyer's immediate position or power
in an organization, but in the long run may cause the organization to
confide in, and depend on, the lawyer less frequently or to a lesser ex-
tent. Whether the individual lawyer would emphasize a short- or long-
term view depends, at least in part, on the lawyer's baseline expecta-
tions regarding her future relationship with the organization. 43 As a
result, what one might classify as a reason for some lawyers to desire a
mandatory blackmail option sometimes also might be identified as a
reason for other lawyers to wish that the option did not exist.
A. Economic Incentives
Corporate attorneys have some financial incentives to desire co-
ercive power. First, it can be used to encourage corporate action that
will entail the use of lawyers (for example, implementing a law com-
pliance mechanism) or that may require the corporation to commis-
sion further legal work in the specific matter at issue. 44
 At least for
41 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. (1983) (authorizing noisy with-
drawals).
42
 In other words, disavowing documents or aspects of representation alert the adver-
sary that those items have caused a sufficient rift in the attorney-client relationship to jus-
tify the lawyer's withdrawal.
43 See infra note 56-57 and accompanying text.
44 See Susan Saab Fortney, Chicken Little Lives: The Anticipated and Actual Effect of Sar-
banes-Oxley on Corporate Lawyers' Conduct, 33 CAP. U. L. REV. 61, 75-76 (2004) (arguing that
the increased focus on compliance enables the lawyer to bill more hours); Donald C.
Langevoort & Robert K. Rasmussen, Skewing the Results: The Role of Lawyers in Transmitting
Legal Rules, 5 S. CAL. INTERnisc. L.J. 375, 377 (1997) (arguing that lawyers, particularly in
business law settings, may skew legal advice in a way that convinces the client that further
assistance from the lawyer is required in order to manage a risk).
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outside counsel, this would enhance the lawyer's fee-earning capabil-
ity. For inside counsel, exercise of the option highlights the lawyer's
importance in the organization and provides an opportunity for the
lawyer to shine.
Second, both the existence of the option and its initial exercise
increases the client's immediate dependence on the lawyer. The client
knows that future behavior must meet the lawyer's approval. As a re-
sult, the lawyer's position vis-à-vis the client generally, and in fee or
salary negotiations specifically, is enhanced.
Third, in some jurisdictions, at least in-house counsel can use the
tools made available through a blackmail option to immunize herself
from discharge. In other words, to the extent a state allows corporate
counsel to sue her employer for retaliatory discharge, the exercise of
the lawyer's threat is less easily punishable by the organization. 45 Even if
the organization has valid, sepat'ate reasons to discharge the attorney,
the timing of a discharge following a lawyer's threat will look suspi-
cious. Manipulative corporate counsel thus can use the blackmail op-
tion to her economic advantage; in other words, to forestall discharge.
In the long term, the calculus is different. Under the traditional
regime of loyalty and confidentiality, lawyers offer clients the valuable
service of being intelligent sounding boards whose advice the client
can accept or reject at will. That service is one of the reasons why cor-
porate lawyers, in particular, are allowed to participate in a broad
range of business decisions. To the extent lawyers gain the option, or
are required, to control the client's actions in these situations, the cli-
ent will be less inclined to turn to the lawyer for advice until consulta-
tion is necessary for legal representation.
Moreover, the existence of coercive authority gives clients an in-
centive to minimize the information in a single lawyer's hands." The
more a lawyer knows about the client's overall practices, the more
45 Although the issue of whether corporate lawyers may file retaliatory discharge
claims is contested, some jurisdictions allow such causes of action. E.g., Gen. Dynamics
Corp. v. Rose, 876 P.2d 487, 490 (Cal. 1994); GTE Prods. Corp. v. Stewart, 653 N.E.2d 161,
166 (Mass. 1995); Burkhardt v. Semitool, Inc., 5 P.3d 1031, 1042 (Mont. 2000); Crews v.
Buckman Labs. Intl, Inc., 78 S.W.3d 852, 866 (Tenn. 2002).
46 See Fisch & Rosen, .supra note 8, at 1101, 1128 (arguing that mandatory blackmail
provisions will reduce the information flow between attorneys and clients); Kaveh Noor-
ishad, The Sarbanes-Oxley Ad and In-House Legal Counsel: Suggestions for Viable Compliance, 18
CEO. J. LEGAL ETI ics 1041, 1050 (2005) (arguing that. Sarbanes-Oxley may cause issuers to
give attorneys less information); cf. : Romani., supra note 8, at 550-51 (arguing that there is
no empirical evidence to support the notion that lawyers will he kept out of the loop by
management); Abuja, supra note 8, at 1333 (arguing that the Sarbancs-Oxley noisy with-
drawal proposal would chill the flow of information to attorneys).
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likely it is that a blackmail option will be triggered. Clients therefore
become well-advised to spread legal work around, rather than to as-
sign it to a single lawyer. This works to the disadvantage of in-house
counsel and law firms that represent individual corporations on an
ongoing basis, but may help firms that tend to perform spot work.
Clients also may make distinctions in when they consult counsel.
Many, perhaps even most, clients will continue to ask lawyers before
the fact about the potential illegality of future or hypothetical behav-
ior. The clients have an acute interest in knowing the consequences of
proposed action. If they confine the inquiry to this stage, the lawyer
will have no basis for questioning the corporation's conduct or mak-
ing a report up the ladder. Only when a client subsequently informs
the lawyer about what it has done, or includes the lawyer in subse-
quent decision making, does the blackmail option present any risk. 47
Accordingly, one would expect many clients to alter their use of law-
yers to conform to this model.
These phenomena may be especially significant to in-house coun-
sel who play a dual role in corporations—part legal advisor and part
participant in the business activities of the corporations. Small corpora-
tions sometimes cannot economically justify full-time legal staffs and
thus expect line attorneys to perform business functions as well. In
larger corporations, staff counsel—or even the general counsel—may
perceive their position as a stepping-stone for obtaining business exper-
tise and eventually moving up in the corporate hierarchy in a non-legal
capacity. A corporation that fears providing business-related informa-
tion to lawyers (i.e., because the professional rules may in the future
require the lawyers to react to the information) will hesitate to employ
lawyers in a dual capacity. The coercive rules thus may enhance the
status of lawyers as lawyers in the corporation, but reduce their eco-
nomic opportunities as current or future businesspersons. 48
Finally, it is important to note that changes in the working rela-
tionship between client and lawyers also may affect the closeness of the
relationship. Clients who become less dependent on individual lawyers
and have less of a history of dealing with them on a regular, intimate
47 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Rele-
vant RIM-ins, 84 11.U. L. RE v. 301, 362 (2004) (arguing that under coercive rules, clients
will ask lawyers to advise diem regarding future hypothetical conduct, but refrain from
discussing actual conduct post hoc for fear that the attorney will need to disclose).
4° Cf. Deborah A. DeMott, The Discrete Roles of General Counsel, 74 FORDHAM L. Rev. 955,
958-61 (2005) (discussing the way the roles played by in-house counsel have changed dur-
ing different periods of American history).
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basis are less likely to view the lawyers they do retain as essential allies in
their working routine. Consequently, the work assigned, and fees paid,
to individual lawyers by single companies are likely to decrease.
B. Incentives Relating to Status Within the Organization
The existence of coercive power is likely to affect the status of
corporate attorneys, sometimes positively, sometimes negatively. On a
simple level, authorizing lawyers to supervise an organization's con-
duct increases the importance of the lawyer as a decision maker
within the organization. 49 Once the organization decides to include
the lawyer in addressing a matter, the organization must be prepared
to heed the lawyer's advice." That is not necessarily the case with re-
spect to other, low-level employees. 51
Moreover, in some jurisdictions, the requirement that a lawyer
respond to specific types of corporate conduct extends to business
decisions, not merely decisions concerning the application of law.
Under California's organizational attorney rule, for example, the law-
yer may take remedial action whenever an agent of the organization
"intends ... to act ... in a manner which is likely to result in substan-
tial injury to the organization."52 This language suggests to agents of
the company that a lawyer who disagrees with the agent's assessment
of the effect of a particular business decision is authorized to, and
should, go over the agent's head.
The existence of coercive authority thus enhances the lawyer's
immediate position in the organization in two ways. First, it makes the
lawyer's advice more important than it might be if offered by layper-
sons within the organization. Second, it suggests that the lawyer has a
place in the corporate decision-making process at least equal to that
of the corporate agent seeking advice. 53 Especially once the lawyer
49 As will be discussed, however, the issue is more complex than it appears at first
glance because the existence of the authority may cause the organization to use a lawyer
less. See infra note 56-57 and accompanying text.
50 Fortney, supra note 44, at 75 (noting that the Sarbanes-Oxley regulations give attor-
neys leverage" in dealing with management).
51 Corporations, of course, accept or reject the advice of ordinary employees at will.
Such employees ordinarily are bound by a duty of loyalty (Le., under agency law) not to
reveal the inhumation outside the organization, at pain of dismissal. Unless they person-
ally participate in corporate misconduct, these employees ordinarily have no legal obliga-
tion to pursue issues beyond the level of their own superiors.
52 CAL. RULES OF PROF'1, CONDUCT R. 3-600(R) (2004).
55
 I do not mean to suggest that the lawyer necessarily will have the same power as the
corporate officer. Whether persons higher up in the management hierarchy will listen to
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exercises coercion, these effects may enhance the lawyer's image both
inside54 and outside 55 the organization.
The picture begins to change as this culture of legal representa-
tion matures. The more that lawyers are perceived to be potential
monitors of the organization rather than team players within it, the
more likely they are to become marginalized. 56 They will still be used
to perform legal work because clients have no choice but to obtain
representation when necessary to resolve active cases. To expand their
duties within an organization, however, lawyers will have to prove
their value based on characteristics other than their trustworthiness
and loyalty.
These considerations probably are more significant for in-house
counsel. For reasons already discussed, 57 organizations faced with a
serious possibility of being coerced have incentives to spread legal
work among various lawyers and to cabin the information each lawyer
receives. This militates in favor of sending work to varied external
counsel.
The marginalization likely will affect line attorneys more than a
general counsel who already is high enough in the organization to be
assured a voice in decision making. A general counsel often has be-
come a member of the management team and is perceived to have
personal incentives that ally him with management—including having
more to lose from opposing management's position. 58 In contrast,
the lawyer or the officer depends, in large measure, on whom they trust more. What does
change in the relationship, however, is that the lawyer gains access, or lines of communica-
tion, to persons higher in the chain of command titan the lawyer might have had without
the authority granted in the rules.
54 Once a lawyer's decision to act upon blackmail authority becomes known within the
organization, the lawyer's visibility is enhanced. For example, had a lawyer for Enron pro-
tested its accounting practices and taken steps to challenge their validity within the firm
without repercussion, the lawyer quickly would have been perceived within the organiza-
tion as a person of status.
55 To the extent that the outside world's expectation is that the lawyer's word must be
heeded, the lawyer will be treated as a more important, and better qualified, player. This is
especially the case in jurisdictions in which the rules specifically assign corporate lawyers a
blackmail-supported role in evaluating the corporation's business, as well as legal, deci-
sions.
Cf. Geoffrey C. Huard, Jr., Ethical Dilemmas of Corporate Counsel, 46 EMORY U. 1011,
1017 (1997) ("Lawyers in a corporate law department, as they are often reminded, are part
of the 'corporate team.'").
57
 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
58 See George M. Cohen, When Law and Economics Met Professional Responsibility, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 273, 284 (1998) (noting that corporate clients Face "agency costs from
not only the managers, whose self-interest gave rise to agency theory in the first place, but
also from in-house counsel").
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there may be less reason for management to trust line attorneys and
empower them to act against management's interests.
The effects of providing coercive authority also may vary depend-
ing on whether in-house counsel is a supervisory or subordinate at-
torney, especially in large companies. A staff attorney, in essence,
serves two masters—her boss and the company (i.e., the boss's boss).
Some blackmail rules permit such lower-level employees to satisfy
their responsibilities either by reporting to their immediate superiors
or by pursuing the matter further, which may displease the supervis-
ing attorney but may be in the company's best interests. 59 Other rules
require line attorneys to pursue the matter all the way up the ladder. 69
The issue of how a blackmail option affects the line attorney's status
within the organization thus becomes exceptionally complicated and
turns, in part, on the precise phrasing of each blackmail rule.
In general, enhancing lawyers' coercive authority will adversely
affect in-house attorneys' personal relationships within the corpora-
tion. 6 i Even low-ranking employees are more likely to shy from
confiding to in-house counsel than before. Consider, for example, an
employee in an Enron-like scenario who has doubts about his em-
ployer's accounting practices. Would that employee be more likely to
discuss the matter with a non-lawyer co-worker who shares his inter-
ests (for example, in doing his best for the company but also main-
taining his position in the company) or with a lawyer freighted with
the obligation to act on information regarding wrongdoing? The an-
swer, of course, depends partly on whether the lawyer's coercive
authority is mandatory or discretionary in nature. Yet it seems clear
that the employee's general sense of how lawyers act, or must act, will
affect the employee's attitude towards staff counsel. 62
59 See 17 C.F.R. § 205.5 (2005) (stating that subordinate attorneys need only report
evidence of a material violation to their supervising attorney, but if they reasonably believe
the supervising attorney has Jailed to comply with the rule the subordinate has the option
of reporting up the corporate ladder); rf. MoDEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.2 (2002)
(providing that a subordinate lawyer does not violate the professional rules when she "acts
in accordance with a supervisory lawyer's reasonable resolution of an arguable question of
professional duty").
62 See Moms. Rums OF Pac•l. Commicr R. 1.13(b)—(c) (2002) (requiring lawyers to
pursue the matter to "highest" authority).
61 This analysis, of course, assumes that the corporation and its employees perceive the
possibility that the company's lawyers sometimes will exercise their coercive authority.
62 See Hazard, supra note 56, at 1018-19 (analyzing and distinguishing the practice of
in-house and external counsel in terms of their "water cooler" and "back-channel" interac-
tions with other corporate employees and the information available to counsel through
such interactions).
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C. Personal Incentives
Corporate lawyers may desire coercive authority for purely psy-
chological reasons. The existence of the power may enhance their
sense of self-worth. It may reassure them that their role as an attorney
does not undermine their own ability to act as moral individuals.
They also have several personal incentives to exercise the power.
In the individual case, forcing the organization to act in a moral or
legal way may, for the lawyer, be equivalent to acting morally herself. It
may also make it easier for the lawyer to avoid personal legal liability
for knowing of, or participating in, corporate misconduct. To the ex-
tent the lawyer's actions become public, the lawyer's behavior may
enhance her personal reputation.
It therefore seems surprising that many lawyers are entrenched in
their opposition to rules that would establish coercive authority, espe-
cially new exceptions to attorney-client confidentiality. 63 One reason
may be that with authority potentially comes responsibility. Strict rules
requiring lawyers to act in accordance with their clients' desires serve
as a protective shield for lawyers." In contrast, the existence of a
blackmail option may open lawyers to personal liability to third per-
sons should they fail to take appropriate action. 65 Lawyers governed
63
 California attorneys who until the year 2004 were governed by a nearly absolute
confidentiality rule, for example, consistently fought against a future crime exception and
the disclosure requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley. Cf. Letter from the State Bar of Cal., Bus.
Law Section, Corp. Comm., to Giovanni P. Prezioso, General Counsel, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n (Aug. 13, 2003), available at http://www.calbanca.gov/calbar/pdfs/sections/
buslaw/corporations/2003-10-0$_SEC.pdf (arguing that stricter California confidentiality
rules should trump the Sarbanes-Oxley requirements).
" One of the major concerns on the floor of the American Law Institute (the "ALI")
debate concerning, inter alia, confidentiality exceptions was the potential for liability that
discretionary exceptions make possible. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERN-
ING LAWYERS §§ 66(3), 67(4) (2000) (providing that a lawyer who "takes action or decides
not to take action permitted under [a crime or fraud exception to confidentiality] is not,
solely by reason of such action or inaction, ... liable for damages"); if. id. § 54(1) (provid-
ing that "[a] lawyer is not liable under § 48 or § 49 for any action or inaction the lawyer
reasonably believed to be required by law, including a professional rule"). Sonic members
of the ALI argued that lawyers should be immunized from liability more generally when-
ever they exercise discretion that the professional rules accord.
63
 Discretionary authority to reveal a client's intent to harm a third person can help
support an injured third party's contention that liability under Tarasoff ik Regents of the Uni-
versity of California should ensue upon the lawyer's failure to prevent the harm. See Fred C.
Zacharias, Privilege and Confidentiality in California, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. Rev. 367, 403 (1995)
(discussing the relationship between confidentiality exceptions and Tarasoff liability). See
generally Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
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by limiting but lawyer-protective rules thus have strong incentives to
disfavor the extension of coercive power.
The ability to "blackmail" clients into acting in an appropriate
fashion, especially if discretionary, also will impose psychological bur-
dens on some lawyers. It requires lawyers to make potentially difficult
moral decisions, including decisions that can he unpleasant for the
client. Even a lawyer who adopts a rule of thumb that she will always
act in the way that the client wishes must at least make that decision
consciously. Arguably, discretionary rules may require more case-by-
case introspection.66 A non-discretionary rule in either direction (that
is, one requiring or forbidding lawyer action) essentially allows law-
yers to remain amoral and to attribute any bad results to their role in
the legal system."
Lastly, according coercive authority weakens lawyers' ability to
perceive themselves as the client's friend and ally. Particularly in-
house counsel, who has a single client and spends each day in the cli-
ent's workplace, may come to feel like an outsider. She no longer can
be one of the team, because she has a special obligation to monitor
the other employees.
D. Outward-Looking Incentives
Some lawyers may desire coercive power for reasons independent
of their personal interests. Most of the rules that explicitly authorize
lawyers to force clients to take particular actions—like the Sarbanes-
Oxley regulations—stein from an assessment that the actions required
of lawyers will promote socially beneficial conduct that is more impor-
tant than the harm the actions might inflict on clients or the attorney-
client relationship. 68 • Some lawyers share this assessment. In other
66 As discussed below, there is room for disagreement about whether discretionary
rules require lawyers to exercise the discretion in each case or whether the grant of discre-
tion leaves the lawyer free to adopt any approach. See infra notes 159-160 and accompany-
ing text.
07 See, e.g., CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS, § 6.1, at. 247 (1986) (dis-
cussing confidentiality as a shield for lawyers); Zacharias, supra note 4, at 373 nn.97-101
(listing authorities that discuss the personal consequences of strict confidentiality rules).
See Richard W. Painter, Standing up to Wall Street (and Congress), 101 Mimi. L. REV.
1512, 1520-21 (2003) (book review) (citing Letter from Richard W. Painter et al., to Har-
vey Pitt, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Conun'n (Mar. 7, 2002), signed by flirty law professors
"seeking a ESECJ rule requiring issuers' lawyers to report unrectified securities law viola-
tions to client boards of directors"); Abuja, supra note 8, at 1333 (arguing that a require-
ment to report up the ladder serves the public interest and increases confidence in the
legal profession); Developments in the Law—Corporations and Society, 117 HA Rv. L. REV. 2227,
2234-37, 2248 (2004) (arguing that a lawyer's responsibility to the public sometimes must
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words, they too believe that preventing immoral or illegal client con-
duct (or promoting moral or legal conduct) justifies occasional coer-
cion. Such lawyers, at least, will have the desire for, and the incentive
to exercise, a blackmail option in order to serve societal interests.
III. SOME RAMIFICATIONS OF THE COMPETING INCENTIVES
Different forms of coercive authority will affect lawyer behavior
in different ways. On the surface, authorizing lawyers to force client
conduct seems only to heighten the status of lawyers in the attorney-
client relationship and to enable them to exercise individual moral
decision making. This seems most apt when the authority is discre-
tionary. The presence of discretionary authority, however, may
influence how lawyers act within the attorney-client relationship. The
responsibilities that come with the authority may cause lawyers to op-
pose or avoid implementing an option to blackmail.
First and foremost, a lawyer who has the option to force clients to
act in a certain way has psychological burdens that do not affect law-
yers bound to secrecy or strict notions of "loyalty." The lawyer must
deal directly with moral issues 69
 She potentially also must consider
whether to exercise coercion upon clients with whom she has built a
personal relationship, perhaps even friendship.
More importantly, the existence of discretionary authority ex-
poses the lawyer to the possibility of liability for failing to take action.
One of the keys to the California Supreme Court's 1976 decision in
Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, the case providing the
legal basis for psychiatrist liability for failure to disclose danger cre-
ated by patients, was the existence of professional rules that allowed
disclosure."
Thus, despite the initial attractiveness of the enhancement of
their status through the grant of discretionary authority, lawyers may
seek to avoid situations that trigger coercive authority. They can do so
transcend the attorney-client relationship and that neither the current Model Rule 1.13
nor Sarhanes-Oxley go far enough); cf. Richard W. Painter, Convergence and Competition in
Rules Governing Lawyers and Auditors, 29 J. CORP. L. 397, 410 (2004) (suggesting that, al-
though it is too early to reach a verdict on Sarbanes-Oxley, customized solutions for each
lawyer-client relationship may be more effective than an all encompassing solution).
69 0f course, a lawyer or law firm may adopt the position that it will always exercise dis-
cretion in accordance with the client's will. Even if such attorneys can avoid making moral
decisions on a case-by-case basis, however, the attorney must at least make the initial de-
termination to cede moral independence. But see infra note 159 and accompanying text
(questioning whether lawyers may cede discretionary authority).
7° See 551 P.2d 334, 347 (Cal. 1976).
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in two ways. First, lawyers can warn a client not to advise them of trig-
gering information. 7 I Second, they can avoid participating in tasks
that are likely to put them in an awkward position. 72
The nature of the triggering mechanism is key to lawyers' ability
to skirt coercive rules. Most such rules depend on lawyers' "knowing"
of client wrongdoing" or being aware of "credible evidence" of
wrongdoing that would be "unreasonable" for them to ignore.74 In the
Enron setting, for example, lawyers for the corporation and auditing
accountants were able to convince themselves—and argue after the
fact—that, although they might have suspected some of the client's
practices, they had a right to rely on the client's factual representa-
tions and thus did not "know" of any wrongdoing." Likewise, even
under the subsequent Sarbanes-Oxley regulation, lawyers in Enron-
like situations still can take the position that accepting the client's
word ordinarily is not "unreasonable."76
When the disclosure authority is mandatory, some of the same
considerations apply. The psychological burdens may be less, because
the lawyer has no choice but to exercise the authority when the trig-
ger is satisfied. The malleability of most triggers, however, continues
to allow wiggle room. Moreover, the lawyer still must be cognizant of
71 See Robert W. Gordon, A New Role for Lawyers? The Corporate Counselor After Enron, 35
CONN. L. REV. 1185, 1202-03 (2003) (arguing that lawyers involved with Enron consciously
avoided learning the facts in order to avoid complicity).
72 Cf. Cohen, supra note 58, at 282 (noting that lawyers may "act in a self-interested way
to use their informational advantage 'for example, information gained through attorney-
client confidentiality] to evade their responsibilities to their clients . „ land] to help their
clients evade their responsibilities towards others"); James D. Cox, Managing and Monitor-
ing Conflicts of Interest: Empowering the Outside Directors with Independent Counsel, 48 Vim_ L.
REV. 1077, 1092 (2003) (advising corporate lawyers to refrain from scrutinizing closely an
issuer's transactions to avoid triggering Sarbanes-Oxley's requirements).
" See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROWL Commur R. 1.6(b) (2002) (allowing disclosure
when the lawyer "reasonably believes" it is "necessary" to prevent particular "reasonably
certain" results); id. at R. 1.13(b) (requiring lawyer to act when she "knows" corporate
officers are acting or intend to act in the prohibited fashion); id. at R. 3.3(b) (requiring
lawyer to act when she "knows" that "a person intends to engage, is engaging, or has en-
gaged in criminal or fraudulent conduct related to the proceeding").
74 See 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(e) (2005).
75 See Susan I'. Koniak, Corporate. Fraud: See, Lawyers, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 195,
209 (2003) (discussing the attitudes of the Enron lawyers).
76 See Susan I'. Koniak, When the Hurtylmrly's Done: The Bar's Struggle with the SEC., 103
Cotom. REV. 1236, 1275-76 (2003) (discussing weaknesses of the trigger requirements
of the Sarbancs-Oxley regulations); see also Cramton et al., supra note 11, at 752 (arguing
that the vague triggering language of the Sarbanes-Oxley regulations will allow lawyers to
avoid their obligations to pursue wrongdoing beyond an initial report); Koniak, supra note
75, at 229-30 (discussing the then-proposed trigger language).
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her potential legal liability. She therefore also may take steps to avoid
blackmail situations.
Under a mandatory regime, the lawyer must consider whether
her obligations to the client include warning the client of the black-
mail option in advance—that is, "mirandizing" the client—and avoid-
ing participation in potential blackmail situations. Some commenta-
tors have suggested, for example, that a lawyer must advise the client
of the existence of confidentiality exceptions, even if she does not
need to spell out how the client can avoid their application."
In-house counsel, especially one who is herself an officer or su-
pervisory attorney, must internalize the potential operation of a man-
datory rule on her working relationship with others in the organiza-
tion. A mandatory rule, in essence, may require her routinely to go
over the heads of other employees with whom she deals on a day-to-
day basis. To the extent a good working relationship with the other
employees is important for the lawyer's job . performance, she has a
special reason to avoid situations in which coercive authority is trig-
gered. The lawyer thus has incentives not only to avoid information,
but also to train employee-clients to ask questions and seek advice in a
form that will not satisly the trigger. 78
77 See, e.g., H. Lowell grown, The Crime-Fraud Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege in the
Context of Corporate Counseling, 87 Kv. L.J. 1191, 1198 n.19 (1999) (noting that "it has been
observed that attorneys should give 'Miranda-like warnings' when counseling clients");
Max D. Stern & David A. Hoffman, Privileged Informers: The Attorney Subpoena Problem and a
Proposal for Reform, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1783, 1804 (1988) (arguing that attorneys should
warn clients about the manner in which client disclosures may not be privileged);
Zacharias, supra note 4, at 387 (discussing the relationship between client autonomy and
advising clients about confidentiality exceptions); cf. DAVID BINDER & SUSAN PRICE, LEGAL
INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A CLIENT CENTERED APPROACH 108 (1977) (proposing a
specific promise to be given to clients that "'1 cannot and will not divulge anything you say
to anyone else without your express permission'"); FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 16, at
161-62 (arguing against saying anything to clients about exceptions to confidentiality be-
cause that would chill the attorney-client relationship). See generally Lee A. Pizzimenti, The
Lawyer's Duty to Warn Clients About Limits on Confidentiality, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 441 (1990)
(discussing the duty to warn clients). California's recently amended confidentiality excep-
tion for future crimes, however, seems to envision lawyers sometimes intentionally with-
holding information about the exception until the client has already revealed the
confidence to the lawyer. CAL. RULES or PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3-100 discussion 1 9 (2004)
(authorizing lawyers not to advise clients because "under certain circumstances, informing
a client of the member's ability or decision to reveal confidential information ... would
likely increase the risk of death or substantial bodily harm").
78
 Thus, for example, lawyers may advise clients to seek advice through hypothetical
questions or other mechanisms that enable the lawyers to avoid knowing, or having credi-
ble evidence, that the client has, or proposes to, engage in wrongdoing. CI Koniak, supra
note 76, at 1271 (arguing that "lawyers never 'know' that their client is committing a crime
or fraud, not before a court has ruled that way").
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On the surface, the combination of the triggering mechanisms
and the ability of lawyers and clients to signal their desires looks like a
simple phenomenon to analyze. Lawyers and clients will decide what
they want from one another and let the other know in time for the
other to shape his or her behavior. Consider this added complication,
however. Transactions often are ongoing. Triggers for different lawyer
obligations and authority may occur at various times during a transac-
tion, as may the opportunity for signaling.
Thus, for example, the new version of Model Rule 1.6 authorizes
lawyers to make disclosures they "reasonably believe necessary" to pre-
vent crimes or frauds in which the lawyer's services have been "used." 79
A client might obtain initial advice from a lawyer but then, by excluding
her from the actual decision to propose or initiate the conduct or by
screening her from details about its execution, avoid putting the lawyer
in a position to disclose. After a transaction is complete, clients some-
times may also have incentives to keep their lawyer in the dark about
what has occurred, because the self-defense exception in Model Rule
1 .6(b) (5) (especially combined with the new authority to prevent
harms in Model Rule .6(b) (3)) can subsequently empower the lawyer
to act coercively. 8° Controlling the lawyer might be more difficult, how-
ever, under Model Rule 1.1 3, which authorizes the lawyer to act when
she "knows" that an officer engages or "intends" to engage in specified
misconduct. 81 Although the knowledge threshold is higher than under
Model Rule 1.6, once the lawyer knows of a corporate agent's intent to
act wrongfully, the agent's decision to dismiss or screen the lawyer may
not be sufficient. to obviate the lawyer's power, because the lawyer con-
tinues to have obligations to the actual client, the corporation. Thus, at
each stage of their transactions, sophisticated lawyers and clients are
likely to be aware of the different triggers and accordingly will coopera-
tively limit the knowledge transmitted to lawyers.82 The willingness of
79 MODEL. RULES OF PROCL CONnucT - R. 1.6(b) (2)—(3) (2002).
8° See id. at R. 1.6(b) (5) (allowing lawyers to disclose to "respond to allegations in any
proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client"); id. at R. 1.6(b)(3)
(authorizing disclosures to "prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial
interests ... of another that is reasonably certain to result or that has resulted front" a
crime or fraud in which "the client has used the lawyer's services"); rf. Meyerholer v. Em-
pire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 1190, 1194-95 (2d Cir. 1974) (finding no violation or
professional rules in former lawyer's disclosure of fraud when lawyer faced threat of being
named as a defendant in a securities classaction).
81 MODEL RULES OF PHOF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2002).
82 An example of a client's attempt to follow such a procedure is found in Balla v.
Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104, 106 (Ill. 1991), in which the client promised the lawyer not
to ship defective dialysis machines, but then did so nonetheless.
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lawyers to signal to clients how they should act may become an impor-
tant part of the attorney-client relationship.
Finally, the mere potential for the exercise of coercive power over
the corporation—whether discretionary or mandatory—may function
as an economic glass ceiling for in-house lawyers, particularly low-level
staff attorneys.83
 It provides incentives for organizations to farm out
work. Perhaps more significantly, it gives corporations a disincentive
to training and including line attorneys in non-legal roles.
These considerations help explain why lawyers might oppose regu-
lation embodying coercive authority even when the regulation seems to
enhance the lawyers' personal power. There are idealistic justifications
for opposing blackmail rules; namely, that the rules negatively affect
the traditional attorney-client trust relationship that allegedly lies at the
heart of adversary ethics.84 More personally, however, blackmail rules
can negatively affect lawyers' interpersonal connections with clients and
their status within a client organization. They affect both how a lawyer
will be approached by an organization's employees and the work she
will (and should) receive.
Let us consider a bit more specifically the four most commonly
discussed forms of corporate blackmail rules, each with two variations,
and consider their likely impact on lawyers and clients. These include
rules giving corporate counsel discretion to threaten remedial action,
rules requiring lawyers to go up the ladder, rules requiring disclosure,
and rules requiring noisy withdrawal.
A. Discretionary Rules
Under the old version of Model Rule 1.1 3, still in effect in many
states,85 lawyers who learn of corporate illegality must take action, but
are given broad discretion regarding what steps to take.86 The ability
of a lawyer to coerce client conduct by threatening to take action is
limited in two ways. First, the lawyer may only proceed "in the best
83 See supra note 47-48 and accompanying text (discussing the business role of many
in-house lawyers).
" See FREEDMAN & Storm, supra note 16, at 49-51 (discussing the importance of client
autonomy in the attorney-client relationship).
85 E.g., GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2000); Mimi. RULES OF PROF'L CON-
DUCT R. 1.13 (2004); VA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2005).
136 MODEL RULES or PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (1983) (listing options that required
remediation "may include").
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interest of the organ ization," 87 not that of society as a whole. Second,
the lawyer's actions may not involve the disclosure of confidences. 88
This version of coercive authority maximizes the ability of officers
and employees to trust and use the corporate lawyer. Ordinarily,
officers and employees will be acting (or think they are acting) in the
best interests of the company, and so can be confident that they can
prevent the lawyer from embarrassing them (for example, by going
over their heads). Indeed, the threat of lawyer action probably is less
than the parallel threat from other non-lawyer employees who have the
same information, because the lawyer's ability to sue for retaliatory dis-
charge when sanctioned for acting is more limited. Lawyers actually
have more to fear than other employees if they exercise a blackmail
option." Model Rule 1.13's express limitation on lawyer disclosures fur-
ther constrains the threat that lawyers pose.
As a consequence, it is fair to conclude that the old version of the
rule will maximize corporate clients' use of lawyers and will maximize
the economic interests of corporate attorneys. On the other hand, it
limits attorneys' independence and status, at. least in the case of in-
house counsel. External counsel have one potentially effective coer-
cive option available: namely, the ability to resign, if they are willing to
lose a single client. In some jurisdictions, this ability to resign is ac-
companied by the right to disavow fraudulent documents that the
lawyers have helped prepare or with respect to which the lawyer's serv-
ices otherwise have been used." Although in-house counsel have the
same option, they are far less likely to exercise it because of their de-
pendence on the single employer.91
By making the choice of remedy other than disclosure discre-
tionary, the old Model Rule 1.13 allows corporate officers to pressure
a lawyer into selecting the option that least disrupts their plans. 92 Be-
" Id.
m3 Id, at R. 1.13 cmt. (noting that "this Rule does not limit or expand the lawyer's re-
sponsibility under 1.6").
" See Sara A. Corelio, Note, In-I-louse Counsel's Right to Sue for Retaliatory Discharge, 92
CoLum. L. Rix. 389, 405 (1992) (noting that attorneys may be more vulnerable to corpo-
rate pressure than non-lawyer personnel who have standing to sue for retaliatory discharge
after blowing the whistle).
gri See MODEL RULES or	 CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. (1983) (providing that a lawyer
may "withdraw or disaffirm any opinion, document, affirmation, or the like").
91 See Developments in the. Law—Corporations and Society, supra note 68, at. 2246 (arguing
that absent a mandatory rule, lawyers will focus on pleasing management).
92 Cf. Sung Hui Kim, The Banality of Fraud: Re-Situating the Inside Counsel as Gatekeeper, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 983, 1003 (2005) ("Management creates the reality In• inside counsel.
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cause the rules do not require, or even give the lawyer the where-
withal, to prevent misconduct unilaterally (for example, through dis-
closure), the lawyer's natural incentives are to balance her obligation
to counteract misconduct against her own interests. Those interests
ordinarily will be to ally herself with management and to pursue the
desires of those officers who control her employment.
The same syllogism applies to line attorneys who can satisfy their
obligations by reporting an issue to supervisory attorneys (or by con-
sulting outside counsel). Although they may be authorized to go over
their superiors' heads, there will be ramifications for doing so. The
line attorney's personal interests are maximized by allowing the supe-
rior to control the moral decision.°
The relationship between management and attorney becomes far
more complicated under variations of the rule—like new Model Rule
1.13—that allow (but do not require) disclosure when the company
does not adhere to the lawyer's wishes. This approach at once re-
quires supervisory or outside lawyers actually to confront moral di-
lemmas when a client insists on pursuing fraudulent or illegal con-
duct and puts these lawyers at risk of personal sanction if they fail to
act.94 The lawyers cart internalize this risk in one of two ways. They
may exercise coercion, which in the long run may cost them the client
or status in the firm. Alternatively, they can exact payment for assum-
ing the risk by signaling to the managers that they will not exercise
the option in exchange for reciprocal loyalty on the managers' part. 95
One might, therefore, expect the bar to splinter in its view of the
desirability of this option. Lawyers who are not prepared to agree to act
complicitly with clients and who take their moral obligations seriously
actually should prefer not to have the discretionary disclosure option,
because it would hurt them economically. In contrast, the option gives
a competitive advantage to lawyers willing to cede their discretion.
Management defines the objectives, identities specific responsibilities for inside lawyers,
and determines whether an inside lawyer's performance is acceptable.").
93 See Douglas Michael McManamort, Comment, Should Attorneys Be .Foutsoldiers in the
War on Corparate Fraud?, 38 U.S.F. L. REv. 163, 183 (2003) (arguing that, under the Sat .-
banes-Oxley regulations, junior attorneys most likely will limit themselves to advising a
supervising attorney of corporate misconduct).
94 See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
95 Cf. McGowan, supra note 12, at 1825-26 (assuming that, at least for disciplinary
purposes, lawyers have total discretion in deciding when to implement discretionary dis-
closure options and that lawyers will make economically rational decisions about imple-
mentation).
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Clients, too, are likely to respond in varying ways. If the corporate
officer in charge of retaining counsel is committed to ensuring the
legality of corporate conduct, he will prefer the lawyer who potentially
might disclose. On the other hand, the officer who emphasizes per-
sonal loyalty is likely to gravitate to the lawyer willing to bargain away
her moral authority.
B. Rules Requiring Lawyers to "Report up the Ladder"
A second form of corporate blackmail, reflected in the new Model
Rule 1.13 and the Sarbanes-Oxley regulations, establishes a presump-
tion that corporate lawyers must report "up the ladder" when they
learn of inappropriate corporate conduct and must pursue the climb to
higher authorities until they are satisfied. 96 The Sarbanes-Oxley regula-
tions differ from Model Rule 1.13 in one important respect: a lawyer
may shortcut her obligation to climb the ladder if the corporation has
established a qualified legal compliance committee (the "QLCC") and
the lawyer reports to it. California adopts a different variation of Model
Rule 1.13. It requires the lawyer to report, at most, to the corporation's
'highest "internal atithority,"97 presumably excepting independent or
public boards of directors that might not be in a position to keep sensi-
tive information confidential."
These rules all share a common trait. They are not discretionary,
except in the sense that they allow the lawyer to make the initial de-
termination that the reporting requirements are triggered. Once the
trigger is satisfied, the lawyer must report and must (except under the
Sarhanes-Oxley compliance committee safe harbor) continue to press
her view to the highest corporate authorities unless her view is sa-
tisfied or she becomes convinced that she was in error.
The absence of discretion has several effects. It minimizes the
psychological burdens that choices impose on lawyers. It makes clear
to corporate employers the benefits of not conveying information to
96
 17 C.F.R. §§205.2(b), 205.3(b) (1) (2005); MoDEL RULES OF PROF'1. CoNnucT R.
L I 3(b) (2002).
97 CAL. RULES OF PROr'L CONDUCT R. 3-000(8)(2).
98 See id. There are no cases or legislative history interpreting the "highest internal
authority" language of R. 3-600(B) (2). The language, however, was adopted in 1989 to
contrast with the then-existing Model Rule 1.13, which did not confine disclosure to inter-
nal management. California's heavy emphasis on securing attorney-client confidentiality
elsewhere in its professional rules supports the notion that Rule 3-600's language was in-
tended to assure that the process of corporate lawyers reporting up the ladder he limited
by the need to preserve their corporate clients' secrets.
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lawyers, or of cabining the information multiple lawyers receive. It
may make the use of one-time outside counsel attractive, because out-
side counsel can both be dealt with on a need-to-know basis and dis-
charged more easily than full-time counsel. It also encourages organi-
zations to use non-lawyers to fulfill tasks when possible.
When one adds the substitute option of reporting to a QLCC or
other internal compliance committee, however, the calculation changes
dramatically. Three sets of questions become important. First, is the
lawyer personally better off flexing her own muscles (that is, by insisting
upon her position up the ladder) or handing off the problem to a
committee that will assume the legal and moral responsibility inherent
in the blackmail paradigm? Second, is the organization better off hav-
ing a lawyer or the committee address the matter? Third, and perhaps
most important, to what extent can the organization signal its prefer-
ence to the lawyer and will the lawyer honor that signal?
The existence of the committee structure may be especially at-
tractive to in-house counsel, because it provides an alternative to the
use of multiple outside counsel. If corporate management is satisfied
that a QLCC, for example, will look after its interests, then inside
counsel can inform the management in advance of her preference for
its use and thereby fend off the competition of outside counsel and
maintain her status within the corporation." In another sense, the
existence of the QLCC as an option provides corporate counsel with
the ability to make personal tactical choices about when referring an
issue to the QLCC will insulate her from criticism and when it will en-
hance her power)"
More likely, however, is the possibility that the corporation itself
will develop a culture. An organization that wishes to avoid independ-
ent analysis of the legality of its operations will establish a QLCC that is
deferential, and will signal to its lawyers that any questions should be
delivered to the committee. It is easy to provide and enforce such sig-
nals to inside counse1. 10 The opportunities for rewarding salaried em-
ployees (for example, through promotions and bonuses) are frequent.
99 Cf. Jill Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, The Qualified Legal Compliance Committee: Using the
Attorney Conduct Rules to Restructure the Board of Directors, 53 DUKE U. 517, 536, 546 (2003)
(noting that attorneys have all incentive to encourage clients to establish QLCGs because
they minimize the attorney's obligations).
100 See id.
un See Henning, supra note 21, at 376 ("Lawyers arc not immune to being co-opted
into a corporate culture that will not permit any claim of wrongdoing.").
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A course of conduct may be more difficult to establish with outside
lawyers unfamiliar with the corporation's routine. Arguably, sophisti-
cated outside counsel can easily and quickly discern management's de-
sires regarding independent investigating committees. 102 Manage-
ment's willingness to risk a signal, however, may depend either upon
the existence of a previous relationship with external counsel or upon
the external counsel's reputation for willingness to accept a signal and
abide by client desires.
One might assume that management always will hire a law firm
with a reputation for malleability and that all economically rational
law firms will signal their malleability. But the accuracy of that propo-
sition may well vary with the context in which a firm is hired. When,
for example, a corporate client expects a court or administrative
agency to shine a spotlight on its actions (e.g., because a shareholder
suit has been or will be filed or because an agency has announced
plans to scrutinize this category of transaction), the corporation
might prefer to engage counsel with a reputation for independence
and objectivity.'" Conversely, a law firm's overall marketability may
depend on the reputation for independence that the firm establishes
with regulators in the field in which the firm practices. 104
Whatever form of counsel is used, compliance-avoidance tech-
niques are most likely to be found in corporations whose manage-
ment is conscious of its own propensity for cutting corners. An attor-
ney who is unwilling to play ball in such an organization will be
unwelcome. Her choice not to use the committee alternative not only
will be met with resistance, but also may be punished. In contrast, a
well-socialized management team that wishes to be notified of poten-
102 See Geoffrey Miller, From Club to Market: The Evolving Role of Business Lawyers, 74
FOROHAM L. REV. 1105, 1129 (2005) ("Clients that wish to test legal limits can select law
firms that are willing to overlook problems. And because law firms need clients, they will
face competitive pressures to offer lax supervision.").
103 See, e.g., Richard W. Painter, Game Theoretic and C.ontractarian Paradigms in the Uneasy
Relationship Between Regulators and Regulatory Lawyers, 65 FokonAM L. REV. 149, 170-71
(1996) [hereinafter Painter, Game Theoretic] (arguing that corporations can benefit from
being represented by attorneys who have pledged or proven to regulators that they take
monitoring obligations seriously); Richard W. Painter, Lawyers' Rules, Auditors' Rules and the
Psychology of Concealment, 84 MINN. L. Rrv. 1399, 1402-03 (2000) ("A client that wants a
good relationship with investors, regulators and lenders may decide ex ante that secrets
should not be kept by lawyers whom it hires to work on public offerings, mergers and simi-
lar transactions.").
101 Painter, Game Theoretic, supra note 103, at 170-71 (arguing that law firms have a
long-term interest in exhibiting law-abiding character to administrative agencies before
which they practice).
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tial law violations and hopes to meet a high standard of conduct will
welcome a reporting lawyer's initiatives. The alternative committee
structure thus is unlikely to benefit companies that already arc good
citizens, or lawyers within them with information about wrongdoing.
C. Disclosure Rules
Disclosure rules are a third form of corporate blackmail. These
rules present the extreme situation. A lawyer who exercises the right
or obligation to disclose ordinarily knows that doing so will end any
possibility of a future relationship with the client. External counsel
will be dismissed. In-house counsel probably will be discharged, or at
least isolated within the organization. The lawyer's calculation of the
personal costs inherent in exercising the blackmail option thus be-
comes inevitable.
Making the confidentiality exception discretionary has two ef-
fects. At least on the surface, it seems to allow the lawyer to include
the potential personal costs in her calculus. And it allows lawyers to
negOtiate their blackmail threat without losing the moral high
ground. In other words, a lawyer who threatens to disclose because an
ethics rule says she must should not be able to be persuaded to forego
disclosure on any basis other than that the client will correct the prob-
lem to the lawyer's satisfaction. If the rule is discretionary, however,
the lawyer arguably is authorized to accept a compromise solution,
including one that benefits the corporate officers and herself.
Outside counsel can perhaps benefit most from these effects.
Outside counsel typically are in a better negotiating position than in-
house counsel, for several reasons. First, because they have less to
lose—one client rather than their entire livelihoods—they have more
leverage. Second, the relationship of retained, as opposed to salaried,
lawyers almost always has started from an arms-length position of ne-
gotiation, one that both parties to the negotiation are conscious of.
Third, the company is in a position to exact a range of retribution (all
of which is negotiable) against a full-time employee, and so is more
able to exert pressure for a favorable settlement. The discretionary
nature of the disclosure exception thus does not necessarily make it
more likely that outside counsel will disclose than in-house counsel,
but it does make it more likely that outside counsel can use the option
to benefit themselves or, at least, to produce some movement by the
company on the moral issue.
When the disclosure exception is mandatory, disclosure will still
cost the salaried employee more than the occasional outside counsel.
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But outside counsel's ability to avoid responsibility (that is, to negoti-
ate away the disclosure option) is less significant. In-house counsel,
particularly one who is a low-level employee, may be able to share the
responsibility with her supervisors and thus spread the costs of con-
fronting management; the company is unlikely, for example,, to dis-
charge the whole legal staff. Moreover, if the lawyer has taken some
steps, such as reporting part of the way up the ladder, enforcement
agencies and plaintiffs' lawyers are more likely to target the higher-
ups, rather than the lower-level employees. The in-house lawyer thus
has both great personal incentives to minimize her mandatory obliga-
tion and potentially greater ability to avoid sanctions if her failure to
disclose is discovered. An outside law firm that has a clear obligation
to disclose under the rules has lesser incentives to demur and will find
it more difficult to escape punishment.
From the organization's point of view, the above considerations
cut in several directions. On the one hand, if a disclosure rule is per-
missive, it is easier for the company to manage the information pro-
vided to external counsel to avoid the possibility of a blackmail threat.
On the other hand, once given the damaging information, in-house
counsel is less likely to exercise the threat to disclose or to negotiate
concessions for foregoing the blackmail option. 1 °5
The same calculus applies when the confidentiality exception is
mandatory, except that the ability of the lawyers to negotiate and con-
vince themselves that they have a legal or moral right to forgo disclo-
sure disappears. The salaried employee's costs of disclosure are higher
than the external firm's, but in foregoing disclosure the employee
knows that she is doing something unethical and perhaps illegal. The
external firm's practical incentives to demur are slimmer.
State law regarding retaliatory discharge lawsuits for lawyers who
arc sanctioned for disclosing may affect the viability of the blackmail
option. in most jurisdictions, external counsel would have a difficult
time suing for retaliatory discharge in any event, because the com-
mon law rule is that clients should be able to retain only lawyers they
trust. In some jurisdictions, the mandatory nature of disclosure may .
provide in-house counsel with a cause of action if she is discharged,
which reduces her disincentives to employ coercion. 1 °6 Interestingly,
105 See Henning, supra note 21, at 327, 368 (noting that a mandatory withdrawal rule
'may create a 'race to the bottom' by encouraging corporations to hire weak lawyers").
LOG In Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. Super. Ct., 876 P.2d 487, 502-03 (Cal. 1994), for exam-
ple, the California Supreme Court conditioned lawyers' ability to sue for retaliatory dis-
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however, at least one jurisdiction (i.e., Illinois) relies upon the man-
datory nature of disclosure as a grounds for disallowing a retaliatory
discharge cause of action, 107 making in-house counsel in such jurisdic-
tions less likely to follow the disclosure rule. 108
D. Noisy Withdrawal Rules
The fourth form of lawyer blackmail in the corporate context is
noisy withdrawal. In large measure, threatening a noisy withdrawal is
equivalent to threatening to disclose, because third parties ordinarily
will be able to discern the reasons for the disavowal of prior represen-
tation. In some jurisdictions, however, the right to employ a noisy
withdrawal is permissive, not mandatory, and is limited to situations in
which the lawyer's services have been used." When the lawyer simply
learns of corporate misconduct that has not involved her, she has no
roving right to alert third parties.
This discretionary form of noisy withdrawal option essentially
puts the lawyers in the same position as other corporate employees.
They too have an obligation to keep the employer's secrets, but not to
the extent that silence would implicate them in a crime or fraud. The
lawyer's remedy is tied to the lawyer's personal right to avoid the im-
putation of wrongdoing and liability for that wrongdoing. A rule al-
lowing such conduct relieves counsel of ambiguity in other remedial
rules that seem to forbid revelation of any corporate information.H°
charge on the lawyer making only disclosures permitted under California's attorney-client
privilege standards.
107 In Balla, the Illinois Supreme Court reasoned that when a lawyer's disclosure of in-
formation to protect third parties is required by the professional rules, there is no need to
provide lawyers with an incentive to disclose through a retaliatory discharge cause of ac-
tion. 584 N.E.2d at 108-09.
'°' David Fish, The Legal Rock and the Economic Hard Place: Remedies of Associate Attorneys
Wrongfully 'Terminated for Refusing to Violate Ethical Rules, 30 UWLA L. REV. 61, 75 (1999)
(arguing that cases like Balla underestimate counsel's economic incentives to avoid disclos-
ing their company's misconduct); Justine Thompson, Note, Who Is Right About Responsibil-
ity: An Application of Rights Talk to Balla v. Gambro, Inc. and General Dynamics Corp. v.
Rose, 44 Dux': L ,l. 1020, 1043 (1995) ("By placing attorneys in this dilemma [of reporting
at risk of being discharged], the Balla court discourages attorneys from making ethical
choices consistent with community standards.").
im See Monte, RULES OF' PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. (1983) (providing that Rules 1.6,
1.8, and 1.16 do nut "preven [t] the lawyer from giving notice of the fact of withdrawal, and
the lawyer may also withdraw or disaffirm any opinion, document, affirmation, or the
like").
110 See CAL. RULES OF PROE'L CONDUCT R. mon(c) (2004) (providing that if a client
corporation persists in proposed wrongdoing despite the remedial steps the lawyer has
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IV. WHEN SHOULD SOCIETY IMPOSE COERCIVE
RESPONSIBILITY ON LAWYERS?
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the above analysis is how
little it has focused upon society's actual interests in lawyer monitoring
of corporate behavior and the countervailing interests in enabling cli-
ents to trust their lawyers. We have seen that different segments of the
bar may favor or oppose coercive rules, or types of rules, for totally ex-
traneous reasons. Some rules will lead companies to divert work from
in-house counsel to external firms, and vice versa. Some rules allow
companies to concentrate work in the hands of a few lawyers or firms,
while others encourage companies to spread the work among multiple
firms that engage in spot work. Some rules have uniquely deleterious
effects on the day-to-day work life of staff counsel.
The discussion also has illustrated that different varieties of coer-
cive authority may have effects on the conduct of companies that are
perverse in light of the goals of providing such authority in the first
place. Discretionary rules, for example, support the possibility of sub-
tle negotiation between companies and lawyers about the lawyers'
threats, or willingness to make threats. It thus becomes likely that
companies that wish to act lawfully and morally from the outset (and
therefore need less heavy-handed monitoring) are more likely to en-
gage lawyers who might exercise the blackmail option. Companies
likely to cut corners will engage lawyers who are willing to negotiate
away their power to enforce better conduct.
Alternative avenues of compliance, like QLCC's" or the actions of
supervisory attorneys under the Sarbanes-Oxley regulations," 2 similarly
can be misused by those companies most willing to exert pressure on
line attorneys to overlook misconduct. As we have seen, the initial reac-
tion of corporations under Sarbanes-Oxley may be to limit information
in the hands of each attorney and to disperse information to multiple
outside firms. 11 s These firms often may not learn of corporate miscon-
duct but, when they do, are capable of implementing the goals of the
blackmail rules. To the extent a maverick company can establish a def-
erential QLCC, however, the calculus changes. The company will keep
matters in-house and signal to staff attorneys that their jobs depend on
taken, "the member's response is limited to the member's right, and, where appropriate,
duty to resign").
1 " See 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(c) (2005).
112 See id. § 205.3(b).
113 See supra notes 46, 99 and accompanying text.
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their willingness to refer issues to the QLCC. In-house counsel can ac-
cede without personal liability or cost. The alternative compliance
mechanism thus becomes a loophole.
Finally, as we have seen, actual implementation of coercive
authority depends on an interplay between lawyers and companies
that has little to do with the societal concerns underlying the rules. In-
house counsel, external counsel who provide full service representa-
tion, and external counsel who perform spot work compete for busi-
ness. Each has a different capacity to communicate with a company,
negotiate in her own interests, and resist pressure to capitulate to
management's desires." 4
 In this competitive environment, companies
will adjust their use of each type of lawyer in a way that minimizes the
exercise of lawyer coercion.
All of this suggests that lawyer blackmail rules may have only lim-
ited effect on the ultimate lawfulness or morality of corporate behavior.
Moreover, to the extent lawyers do try to control corporate conduct, it
ultimately may be for self-serving reasons (for example, avoiding per-
sonal liability) rather than because lawyers wish to, or must, serve soci-
ety's goals. This leads to the core question: why would we authorize law-
yers to force a client to follow their advice?
The automatic response of lawmakers who promoted regulations
pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is simply that lawyers have a role
to play in preventing clients' illegal acts before they occur. 115 But some
commentators expect lawyers to play a broader role—in preventing
client fraud, legal but harmful acts, perhaps even immoral conduct, in
addition to client illegality."6 For the most part, the existing codes
draw a bright-line rule regarding illegal conduct: namely, that it is per
114 See Fisch & Rosen, supra note 8, at 1127-30 (noting that lawyers' willingness to turn
a blind eye to misconduct stems from their dependence on clients, but noting that this
dependence may vary among different kinds of attorneys).
115 See, e.g., Lisa I4. Nicholson, Sarbox 307's Impact on Subordinate In-House Counsel: Be-
tween a Rock and a Hard Place, 2004 MICH. ST . L REV. 559, 589 (noting lawmakers' view of
the growing and important role of lawyers in the governance of issuers); Ahuja, supra note
8, at 1333 (noting the public interest in having attorneys report up the ladder); cf. Fred C.
Zacharias, Reform or Professional Responsibility as Usual: Whither the Institutions of Regulation
and Discipline?, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1505, 1511 n.30 (describing Sarbanes-Oxley as a re-
sponse to the negative involvement of lawyers in recent corporate scandals).
116 Cf. Cranston et al., supra note 11, at 739 (praising the ABA's stricter 2003 version of
Model Rule 1.13 making reporting-up mandatory when that would be in the best interests of
the organization); REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY 39 (2003), available at Imp://www.abanet.org/buslaw/corporaterespons-
ibility/final_report.pdE (stating that communication up the corporate ladder "may be a de-
sirable contribution to corporate governance even if the rules of professional conduct do not
mandate it").
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se undesirable and that lawyers should never be allowed to counte-
nance illegality, at pain of personal repercussions. But the codes seem
ambivalent with respect to other forms of questionable client behavior
to which attorney coercion might respond, including ill-defined
breaches of fiduciary duty 117 and poor business decisions. 118 Lawyers
traditionally have provided representation for clients involved in such
behavior and society traditionally has condoned this representation.
As a general principle, therefore, society may not be prepared to allow
lawyers to make clients behave only in ways that the lawyers deem
honest, fair, and moral.
Three broad considerations account for this reluctance. First,
society probably does not trust: lawyers to be the arbiters of honest,
fair, or moral behavior, nor is there any reason to suspect that lawyers
are well-suited to that task." 9 Second, and related, is the fact that
American society places a premium on individual autonomy. 12° Clients
have some right to make their own decisions regarding the fairness or
morality of their conduct, though they may have to suffer the conse-
quences if their peers subsequently disagree with actions they have
taken. Third, America's litigiousness makes it imperative that clients
be able to engage and confide in lawyers. 121 Requiring lawyers to rou-
tinely turn against their clients might undermine the ability of clients
as a whole to utilize lawyers.
A. Lawyers as Arbiters of Appropriate Conduct
One reason society may not be willing to give lawyers broad dis-
cretion to make clients behave in ways that the lawyer deems appro-
priate is that society probably does not trust lawyers to be arbiters of
such behavior. If the recent corporate scandals make nothing else
clear, it is that lawyers have not uniformly implemented the tools that
they have had available to counteract corporate misconduct. Susan
Koniak has made a persuasive factual presentation supporting the
317 See 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(1) (2005) (defining what lawyers need to report as evidence of
a material violation, a material breach of fiduciary duty, or a similar material violation);
Fisch Sc Rosen, supra note 8, at 1113-14 (Suggesting that the "similar violation" language of
Sarbanes-Oxley renders the provision too vague).
"8 See CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3-600(B) (2004) (requiring lawyers to act
with respect to proposed corporate conduct that the lawyer believes is likely to injure the
corporation).
317 See infra notes 122-126 and accompanying text.
120
	 infra notes 127-128 and accompanying text.
121 See infra notes 129-138 and accompanying text.
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proposition that lawyers participated directly in some of the recent
scandals. 122 Even if one does not accept Koniak's most flamboyant
rhetoric, it is undisputable that at least some of the lawyers involved
saw their main role as assisting clients to accomplish their ends, with-
out making any moral judgments.
More important than this anecdotal evidence concerning the
likely effectiveness of coercive rules, however, are two realities. First,
there is no basis for thinking that most lawyers will act objectively to
serve societal interests if simply given the opportunity to do so. That
traditionally has not been the way lawyers have perceived their role. 123
Lawyers are not trained in making moral judgments. Arguably, their
education and practice requires them to view issues more in terms of
competing arguments than appropriate results.
Second, as illustrated by this Article's analysis, lawyers have per-
sonal incentives that sometimes prevent them from judging client
conduct objectively. Far from possessing the definitional neutrality of
members of the bench, lawyers are naturally aligned with clients. The
business reasons for which lawyers ordinarily enter the attorney-client
relationship suggest that they will emphasize economic rather than
outward-regarding considerations.
These realities have implications for coercive rules. They explain
the hesitation of some code drafters to rely on lawyers to do more
than counsel against illegal conduct. They also illustrate why reforms
that purport to enhance lawyer authority to force appropriate client
conduct may not do the trick.
Discretionary rules, like new Model Rules 1.6 and 1.13, may not
adequately confront lawyers' natural limitations. To justify making
lawyer gatekeeping optional, rulemakers need some special reason to
set aside the traditional distrust of lawyers. As this Article's analysis
suggests, the corporate setting that has stimulated recent reforms
does not look like a promising context for outward-regarding lawyer
behavior.
Reformers also have done a questionable job of confronting the
way coercive rules will operate in practice. Given the fluid nature of the
attorney-client relationship described in this Article, coercive rules
122 Koniak, supra note 75, at 196-211; see PARTNoy, supra note 8, at 331 (documenting
the actions of counsel in the Enron scandal); Pugh, supra note 39, at 662-64 (discussing
the role of lawyers in the Enron scandal).
1" See Fred C. Zacharias, Reconciling Professionalism and Client Interests, 36 Wm. & MARY
L. Rev. 1303, 1305-06, 1314-27 (1995) (discussing the history of client orientation and
arguing that lawyers should be prepared to act in a more objective fashion).
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should be written with sufficient precision to ensure that coercive
authority works in its intended fashion. Specifically, they should include
safeguards to prevent lawyers from avoiding the obligation to imple-
ment coercion impartially. In other words, the drafters must take a real-
istic view of the economics of practice in determining whether lawyers
will exercise their options with a view to the drafters' purposes. 124 The
drafters also may need to make distinctions in the rules that take into
account the incentives of different types of lawyers. 125 On this view, even
the mandatory SEC requirements seem to fall short. 126
B. Client Autonomy
The premium society places on client autonomy is a second con-
sideration that might caution against giving lawyers broad coercive
power. In the corporate context, however, autonomy considerations
do not have the same force as when individuals' freedom to select
conduct is at issue. Corporations have economic rights, which benefit
all their constituents, but their constituents typically are sufficiently
diverse that they would disagree on most moral issues. Preserving the
authority of one corporate agent to act autonomously may well de-
prive other constituents of the same freedom.
Thus, to the extent professional norms require lawyers to abide
by corporate clients' decisions, they are not rejecting principles of
autonomy so much as deciding who within a corporation is most likely
to exercise the corporation's ability to make choices that best accom-
modate the firm's economic interests and society's separate interest in
appropriate outward-regarding conduct. Rules that limit lawyers' abil-
ity to force behavior make one of two judgments (or both). First, they
may assume that lawyers usually arc not in the best position to balance
the interests—for example, because lawyers will have limited informa-
tion about the grand scheme in which a case arises or because lawyers
124 cf. McGowan, supra note 12, at 1838 (proposing and analyzing a systematic grant of
immunity from liability to lawyers that would provide incentives for them to inform
authorities about corporate illegality).
115 See Fred C. Zacharias, The Future Structure and Regulation of Law Practice: Confronting
Lies, Fictions, and False Paradigms in Legal Ethics Regulation, 44 Aluz. L. REv. 829,841 (2002)
(characterizing the ethics codes' general assumption that all lawyers are alike and should
be governed by the same rules as counterproductive); Fred C. Zacharias, Reconceptualizing
Ethical Roles, 65 G•o. WAsti. L. Rev. 169, 171 (1997) (arguing that ethics codes should ac-
knowledge differences among types of lawyers).
126 See, e.g., Cramton et al., supra note 1 1, at 751-63 (arguing that the trigger mecha-
nisms in the Sarbanes-Oxley regulations allow lawyers too much leeway); Koniak, supra
note 76, at 1275-78 (questioning the effectiveness of SEC regulations governing lawyers).
492	 Boston College Law Review
	 [Vol. 47:455
have limited economic or moral expertise in implementing the neces-
sary calculus. Second, the rules may simply assume that the lawyers in
question are unlikely to implement societal interests any better than
management. As we have already seen, in-house counsel often are too
tied or dependent on management to challenge management's deci-
sions. External counsel may focus too heavily on their own interests in
earning present and future fees.
Rules that allow or require lawyers to influence corporate clients'
conduct also may stem from a variety of justifications. Most, but not all,
such rules confine themselves to addressing illegal client behavior. 127
Because lawyers are versed in the law, they arguably have special exper-
tise in determining what conduct is appropriate and permissible.
It is important to recognize the limits of this reasoning, however.
In most blackmail situations, there is little question about the legality
of the conduct itself. Even if there is, the lawyer can eliminate the
question by providing legal advice. The real issue—for example, in
Enron—is whether the client should, or should be able to choose to,
violate the law. On this, the lawyer has no more expertise than the
corporate manager. Accordingly, the reason for placing the decision
in the lawyer's hands must be something else.
Perhaps the reason consists of a sense that lawyers are more likely
to act independently or objectively than the managers, or more in the
interests of the silent corporate constituents. As this Article has dis-
cussed, however, one cannot assume independence on the part of the
lawyer in all circumstances. In-house counsel, in particular, may have
as much to lose from insisting on lawful conduct as the corporate
manager. If the governing rule has the effect of influencing corpora-
tions to spread legal work among many different external firms, the
rule may in fact generate a body of relatively independent lawyer de-
cision makers. At the same time, however, these lawyer decision mak-
127 There are exceptions, however. California's professional rules, for example, argua-
bly require lawyers to act against economically imprudent corporate decisions. See CAL.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3-600(B) (2004); supra note 52 and accompanying text. The
Sarbanes-Oxley regulations require lawyers to counteract "material violations" of securities
obligations or "breaches of fiduciary duty" by an issuer. 17 C.F.R. gg 205.2(i), 205.3(b)
(2005) (requiring lawyers to report a material violation, defined as a material violation
under federal or state securities laws, a "material breach of fiduciary duty," or a "similar
material violation" of any federal or state law). Other administrative regulations impose
responsibility on lawyers to supersede their clients' decisions to file information that is
arguably accurate but misleading. See Fred C. Zacharias, Understanding Recent Trends in Fed-
eral Regulation of Lawyers, 2003 PROF. Law. 15, 16-21 (cataloguing some of these regula-
tions).
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ers are also likely to be given less than the optimal amount of infor-
mation to make decisions.' 28
C. Facilitating or Enabling the Provision of Legal Advice
Society's reluctance to overemphasize lawyers' ability to coerce cli-
ents may be attributable to a fear of undermining the traditional attor-
ney-client relationship. On one level, coercive regulation—particularly
mandatory blackmail rules—simply clarifies ambiguity created by pre-
vious ethics regulation that seems to require lawyers to assist corporate
clients and remain silent about potential wrongdoing. Lawyers are ac-
countable for their own actions. When they participate in unlawful or
tortious conduct, they can be sanctioned. 129 Authorizing lawyers to
counteract the wrongful conduct arguably makes explicit the notion
that legal representation does not include enlisting a lawyer as a co-
conspirator,'"
This perspective helps explain those rules that authorize disclo-
sure or noisy withdrawal with respect to aspects of corporate miscon-
duct in which a lawyer's services have been used. 131 It does not, how-
ever, justify broader rules that expect lawyers to counteract client
wrongdoing in which they have not participated. 132 This distinction
highlights the quandary raised by the whole notion of a blackmail op-
tion; namely, the extent to which society wants lawyers to act as a uni-
lateral check on client misconduct.
128 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
12g See Zacharias, supra note 13, at 1396, 1396 nn.51-55 (listing authorities that. de-
scribe ways in which lawyers can he sanctioned for participating in unlawful conduct).
I" George Cohen perhaps best encapsulates the regulatory balance that needs to be
struck between confidentiality requirements and disclosure exceptions:
Although clients benefit from confidentiality rules, and the attorney-client
privilege and work product doctrine give lawyers market advantages over
other groups, these benefits come at a price, itaniely, the limitations designed
to thwart lawyer-client collusion. You have to take the bad with the good. For
this to work, however, the "good" has to be good enough for clients and law-
yers to buy into the system.
Cohen, supra note 58, at 296-97 (footnote omitted). Presumably, from a regulatory per-
spective, Cohen's "bad" also must be bad enough to justify giving clients and lawyers the
benefits of confidentiality. See id.
131 E.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'', CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2)—(3) (2002); 17 C.F.R.
§ 205.3(d)(2); Proposed SEC Noisy Withdrawal Rule, supra note 11, at 71,706, quoted in 68
Fed. Reg. 6324, 6326 (allowing lawyer to disaffirm false or misleading filings "that the attor-
ney has prepared or assisted in preparing").
132 CAL. Ruus or PROCL CONDUCT R. 3.600(8) (containing no requirement of lawyer
participation in the wrongdoing before lawyer permitted to act).
494	 Boston College Law Review 	 I Vol. 47:455
When one views the adversarial system fairly, it is clear that our
legal system does not contemplate lawyers routinely policing their cli-
ents, because that would lead to the avoidance of legal representation
or increased use of lawyers who have reputations for disregarding
their professional obligations. The core notion of the system is that we
want clients to use and trust legitimate lawyers so that the lawyers can
do their jobs and enable the system to accomplish its functions."3
Society does have an interest in having clients consult lawyers
about legal issues and receive advice regarding the lawfulness of their
conduct. Arguably, society may even be willing to insist that clients
follow that advice to the extent that it identifies actions that clients
must avoid to satisfy the law. On the surface, however, the interest in
promoting law-abiding behavior cuts against rules that would allow
lawyers to threaten clients into acting morally or into avoiding wrong-
ful actions for which there is a legitimate argument in favor of their
lawfulness. 154 Clients are unlikely to confide in a lawyer whom they
know can force them to abide by her personal moral code.
It is the bright-line nature of these conclusions that highlights the
real difficulty inherent in assuming lawyers have more than an advi-
sory role in counteracting client misconduct. 135 Is there illegal client
conduct that a lawyer sometimes should countenance? Some com-
mentators might answer affirmatively with respect to at least three
scenarios: lawyers arguably should defer to the client (I) because (or
when) coercion would unduly deter this and other clients from seek-
ing legal advice on other issues in the future; (2) when a client, such
as the corporation, is acting reasonably by violating the law—for ex-
ample, because the benefits of non-compliance outweigh the costs;
133 See, e.g., DAVID LURAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE 68-81 (1988) (discussing the conse-
quentialist justifications for the adversary system); Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of
Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 46-56 (1991)
(outlining the theoretical underpinnings of the adversary system); cf FREEDMAN & SMITH,
supra note 16, at 13-43 (discussing the theory of the adversary system, but also emphasiz-
ing client autonomy considerations).
1" Compare 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d) (2) (2005) (allowing attorneys to report confidential
information that the attorney reasonably, believes is necessary to prevent the issuer from
committing a material violation), with id. § 205.3(6)(6)—(7) (absolving some investigating
attorneys from reporting under sonic circumstances when "retained or directed ... to
assert, consistent with his or her professional obligations, a colorable defense on behalf of
the issuer").
135 Arguably, lawyers always have the authority to advise clients to act morally or in a
socially acceptable way, and professional rules could impose an obligation on lawyers to do
so always. Cf. MODEL RULES or PROVL CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2002) (authorizing lawyers to
counsel clients regarding moral and political issues).
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and (3) when it is too late for the lawyer to stop the violation of law,
or the costs to the client of stopping it at this stage are draconian
compared to the benefits to society of full law compliance.
Conversely, is there legal but otherwise inappropriate behavior
regarding which a lawyer should unilaterally be able to countermand
the client's autonomy? In the corporate context, one can skirt the is-
sue somewhat by concluding that certain corporate decision makers
sometimes are not exercising the client's autonomy—in other words,
are not actually acting in the corporation's interests. More generally,
one might conclude that some societal or third-party interests simply
are more important than the client's interest in controlling the deci-
sion and achieving the result most beneficial to the client..
The problem for rulemakers is that it is hard to draw clear lines
that balance society's interest in law compliance or "good results"
against the other interests. Consequently, most rules that acknowl-
edge the possibility of grey areas use one of two proxies. Some limit a
lawyer's options to situations in which the lawyer's actions are "in the
interests of the organization," tab which does not adequately take into
account society's interests in behavior that affects the public or third
parties. Other rules simply give lawyers discretion to act,'" which al-
lows lawyers to base their decisions on personal, potentially venal, in-
centives. A discretionary rule may be the best solution, but the inter-
ests to be balanced should be better defined if the goal is to use
lawyers as a surrogate enforcer of societal interests.
Consider, for example, the old version of Model Rule 1.13, which
requires lawyers to act but gives them the choice of remedy. The rule
requires lawyers to act in the "organization's interest," which pre-
sumably allows counsel to consider countervailing costs to the com-
pany. The rule, however, does not tell lawyers how to weigh those
se mom, Ru les or Pitor'i. Coronicr R. 1,13(b) (2002); cf. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d) (al-
lowing lawyers to make disclosures to prevent injury to the property of the issuer or inves-
tors).
151 MODEL RULES OF NOVI CoNDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2002). It may be that rules that refer
to lawyers' ability to exercise discrelion intend discretion to be exercised in a particular
way. Compare Samuel J. Levine, Wilting Ethical Discretion Seriously: Ethical Deliberation as Ethical
Obligation, 37 IND. L. REV. 21, 46 (2003)• (arguing that discretion must be exercised in a
deliberative fashion), with McGowan, supra note 12, at 1825 n.1 (arguing that a grant of
discretion means that a lawyer may not be disciplined for acting in any manner she sees
Fit). This issue probably is too complex to resolve uniformly with respect to all discretion-
ary rules because code drafters may have a variety of reasons for according lawyers a range
of options. See generally Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Lawyer Dkeretion, 91 MINN.
Rsv. (forthcoming 2006) (discussing the justifications for discretionary rules).
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costs, or even directly to emphasize them. It thus opens the door to
pressure from management.
Now consider the Sarbanes-Oxley regulations, which make it
mandatory for lawyers to climb the ladder with concerns about illegal
conduct or breaches of fiduciary duty. These rules do not allow law-
yers even to consider the effect of climbing the ladder on the institu-
tion's willingness or ability to consult counsel.
The discretionary disclosure provisions of new Model Rule 1.13
allow lawyers to disclose (or threaten to disclose) specifically in cir-
cumstances in which illegal corporate activity "is reasonably certain to
result in substantial injury to the organization." By limiting its scope
to illegal conduct, Rule 1.13 is drawing a defensible bright-line rule:
corporate clients have no right to insist on breaking the law. At first
glance, the rule also seems to inform the lawyer of how to balance the
corporation's interest in confessing its conduct when doing so will be
economically damaging—disclosure is only appropriate when the or-
ganization will suffer substantial injury as a result of the illegal con-
duct. Yet upon closer examination, because any illegality is likely to
cause substantial injury if the client is caught and sanctioned, the rule
falls short. It again fails to guide lawyers on how to act when the net
balance of the injury versus the potential economic gain of maintain-
ing silence favors silence. By leaving the issue entirely to lawyer discre-
tion—indeed, by not even noting the possibility that the substantial
injury will be outweighed—the rule allows lawyers to exercise their
discretion without reference to the reasons why society might want
lawyers to act in a particular direction.
V. OTHER BLACKMAIL CONTEXTS
Much of the recent controversy concerning potential attorney
coercion has focused on corporate attorneys and rules like Model
Rule 1.13 and the Sarbanes-Oxley regulations. Interestingly, however,
these rules actually are relatively well-defined—at least when com-
pared to rules that allow lawyers to coerce clients to accept the law-
yers' will in 'other contexts. Most of the rules governing organizations
at least focus directly on breaches of legal duties, which lawyers ar-
guably should not countenance and already are forbidden to assistm
135 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'1. CONDUCT R. I.13(c) (2) (2002).
1" See id. at R. 1.2(d) ("A lawyer . shall not ... assist a client in conduct that the lawyer
knows is criminal or fraudulent.").
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Consider a few other forms of attorney coercion, however. Typi-
cally, lawyers are authorized to resign from representation when a client
wishes to pursue avenues the lawyer considers "repugnant,"I 40
 "impru-
dent," 141
 or with which the lawyer has "fundamental disagreement." 142
At one level, the threat to withdraw hardly seems coercive. The client
still has the option to retain other counsel who is willing to do as the
client wishes. But often, hiring new counsel will be expensive, cause
delay, and may be emotionally dillicult for clients—especially individual
clients who are unfamiliar or uncomfortable with the process of retain-
ing counsel. Moreover, in some situations, allowing a lawyer to withdraw
simply is unrealistic—for example, when a lawyer insists that the client
accept a settlement which is close to what the client would otherwise
accept, but is not quite at that level. Substituting counsel at this junc-
ture may cause the offer to he reduced, because the adversary will know
that the client's costs of proceeding have risen.
What is distinctive about coercion through threatened resignation
is that it need not be based, like the lawyer action under the organiza-
tional rules, on proposed illegality by the client. The lawyer may make
her threat simply because she disagrees strongly with the client's view—
as a moral matter or as one of legal strategy. The resignation power
thus gives lawyers broad discretion to impose their will on malleable
clients.
In exercising this discretion, lawyers presumably have the capacity
to consider their personal economic interests; in other words, the ex-
tent to which they are prepared to risk their fees and the extent to
which their own interests arc benefited by client compliance with their
directions. Lawyers also have broad leeway to emphasize moral consid-
erations, even though that cuts directly against the notion of client
autonomy. Presumably, the codes intend lawyers to restrain their own
use of coercion, because lawyers continue to be bound by fiduciary du-
ties to clients and the bar's tradition of honoring client decision mak-
ing, but nothing in the rules emphasizes those limitations. 143
By the same token, the more that lawyers are known to use their
resignation power to control distasteful clients, the less clients will al-
140 1d. at R. 1.16(b)(4).
141 MODEL RULES OF NOVI, CONDUCT R. 1.16(b) (3) ( 1983).
192 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNoucr R. 1.16(b) (4) (2002).
143 CI Stephen Gillers, Caveat Client: How the Proposed Final Draft of the Restatement of the
Law Governing Lawyers Fails to Protect Unsophisticated Consumers in Fee Agreements with Lawyers,
10 Gm. J. LEGAL E.•nics 581, 613 (1997) (noting that courts typically limit clients' poten-
tial remedy for a lawyer's withdrawal to actual damages).
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low lawyers to learn about them. The traditional paradigm is that cli-
ents should feel free to confide information that may not bear directly
on the legal issues at hand, leaving it to counsel to determine what is
useful)" In the criminal defense context, in particular, clients may be
hesitant to reveal facts that make them seem "repugnant"—including
facts about past criminality, ongoing sexual proclivities, and other
vices. One would expect two dynamics to result from lawyers' coercive
use of this information: (1) more clients—especially those who are
most conversant with lawyers' actual practices—will self-censor, and
(2) a market will develop of lawyers with a reputation for not exercis-
ing coercion.
The withdrawal power is not the only instance in which lawyers can
force clients to accede to their will. The codes, for example, give law-
yers discretion not to introduce evidence they believe to be false. 146
 By
threatening not to put a client on the stand, a lawyer can coerce the
client into agreeing to testify in the way the lawyer deems acceptable." 6
More broadly, a lawyer can use her authority to determine the tactics in
a case to force a client to adopt an approach to the case that is not in
line with the client's desires." 7
 Thus, for example, a client might prefer
a scorched earth approach or aggressive cross-examination of tender
witnesses, but the lawyer may—by threatening to withhold harsh cross-
examinations—prevail upon the client to accept a different theory of
the case that cedes some substantive positions the client could other-
wise insist upon taking)"
144
 This is the justification for the broad definition of confidential information that is
found in all the professional codes. The Model Rules, for example, define confidential
information as all information "related to the representation." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2002). The Model Code incorporates all "information gained in the
professional relationship." MODEL. CODE of PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(a) (1969).
145
 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (1983) (stating that "(a] lawyer may ref-
use to offer evidence that the lawyer reasonably believes is false").
146 Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF . '. CONDUCT R. 3.3(a) (3) (2002) (including an exception
for criminal clients).
147
 Mom. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (1983) (assigning lawyers authority to
determine the means of litigation). The new Model Rules are somewhat less clear on this
issue, noting that usually the client will defer to the lawyer on questions of tactics, but leav-
ing unstated who controls the decision if the lawyer and client ultimately disagree. See
MODEL RUt.Es OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. (2002).
148 The dynamic effect of attorney blackmail may become most evident when lawyers as-
sert coercive power by inferring authority from imprecise rules. In Nix u Whiteside, for exam-
ple, a lawyer confronted by potential client perjury not only threatened to inform the court,
but also threatened to impeach the client if he took the stand and testified to a particular
story. 475 U.S. 157, 161 (1986). The U.S. Supreme Court apparently approved this process—
which starkly changed the participants' relative power status within the attorney-client rela-
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In all of these situations, as well as situations in which lawyers are
granted discretion to disclose confidential information in order to
preserve third-party interests,'" the power to blackmail clients is far
broader than the power identified in organizational rules. It is not
limited to illegal choices the client might make, nor limited (at least
not ostensibly) in the grounds upon which the power may be exer-
cised. As a practical matter, lawyers therefore can use their authority
to insist upon client decisions that the lawyers consider morally re-
quired, but that the clients do not. Lawyers also have leeway to take
their own economic incentives into account, as in the corporate set-
ting. Although this leeway theoretically is constrained by fiduciary
principles, the rules themselves do not specify when and how the dis-
cretion to blackmail may be exercised. The codes, in short, leave it to
individual lawyers to balance the societal concerns regarding client
autonomy and facilitation of legal representation without directly at-
tempting to assure that lawyers act upon those considerations.
In general, it is individual clients who will be most prone to law-
yer blackmail. Three characteristics would make a client especially
prone to coercion. Clients least familiar with the process of obtaining
new, counsel and with the alternative representation that may be avail-
able are most likely to accede to the lawyer's threats. Those who are
limited by cost considerations also arc vulnerable; it is• the smaller
cases in which lawyers will be most willing to chance their fees. Finally,
clients who already know that a court will not allow them to discharge
a lawyer (for example, because discharge has already been attempted)
have the least ability to resist a threat.
When these characteristics are considered together, it appears
that it is the poorest and least sophisticated clients whose autonomy is
most likely to be restricted by lawyer blackmail. Yet it is precisely the
autonomy of these kinds of clients that the rules, and the adversarial
ethic they embody, are supposedly designed to protect.'" By failing to
include guidelines or protections for client interests in the terms of
blackmail rules, the code drafters may take with one hand what they
have purported to give with the other.
tionship. See id. at 1613-69 (noting the "special duty of an attorney to prevent and disclose
frauds"). After the lawyer's threats, one can reasonably assume that the client would let the
lawyer call the future shots, but also would revise his trust in and use of counsel.
"9 MODEL RULES OF PROF'', CoNnuur R. 1.6(1,) (2002) (permitting disclosure to pre-
vent harm to the financial interests or property of another).
150 See Zacharias, supra note 27, at 169, 171, 173-74 (discussing the "criminal para-
digm" and its civil parallels).
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This Article would be remiss if it did not address, albeit briefly,
the most common form of lawyer coercion—psychological pressure
imposed by forceful lawyers giving clients (especially dependent cli-
ents) advice in a result-oriented fashion. The theory of the profes-
sional codes is that clients should set the objectives of representation
and that lawyers should enhance client autonomy. 15 ' But the codes
also encourage lawyers to exercise independent judgment, remon-
strate with clients, and counsel them based on a variety of factors
other than the client's immediate clesires. 152 As a matter of practice,
everyone knows that lawyers often use this authority to persuade or
bully clients into making decisions—particularly plea and settlement
decisions—that the lawyers consider appropriate.
Presumably, lying to a client in order to produce his agreement
would not be countenanced by disciplinary authorities or by courts
enforcing fiduciary principles. Suppose, however, that a lawyer simply
is forceful. Or suppose that the lawyer uses her authority to withhold
information temporarily from a clienti 53 so that she can present the
options at a time when the client will be more malleable. 154 In theory,
client autonomy remains intact because the client is the ultimate deci-
sion maker. Yet the lawyer is in control.
It is important to note that the lawyer's action in these scenarios
may or may not be in the client's best interests. Consider, for exam-
ple, the lawyer who forcefully convinces an innocent criminal defen-
dant to plead guilty on the (realistic) basis that conviction is likely. Or
consider the lawyer who persuades a client who insists that he is sane
to pursue an insanity defense.' 55 One can argue both that the lawyer is
151 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2002) (stating that "a lawyer shall
abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation").
152 See id. at R. 2.1 (stating that "a lawyer shall exercise independent professional
judgment and render candid advice"). See generally Zacharias, supra note 123 (discussing
the role of objectivity in legal practice).
153 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4 cult. (2002) (stating that "the
lawyer should fulfill reasonable client expectations for information consistent with the
duty to act in the client's best interests"); If. id. at R. 1.2 ma. (noting that "Ii1n a case in
which the client appears to he suffering diminished capacity, the lawyer's duty to abide by
the client's decisions is to be guided by reference to Rule 1.14").
154
 The classic example is when a criminal defendant forbids the lawyer even to discuss
a plea bargain, but the lawyer nonetheless obtains a plea offer and waits to offer it to the
client until the eve of trial, when fear of conviction is likely to make the client more recep-
tive to admitting guilt.
155
 In the Unabomber case, for example, Theodore Kaczynski's lawyers went to great
lengths to preserve the option of an insanity plea or the ability to present evidence of men-
tal instability during the guilt phase of trial despite Kaczytiski's direct order that they not
pursue that course. United States v. Kaczynski, 239 F.3c1 1108, 1111-12 (9th Cir. 2001); id.
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serving the client's interests and that the lawyer deprives the client of
true autonomy.
For purposes of this Article, we need not resolve these troubling
issues. The essential point is that lawyer coercion, for whatever reason,
is routine. In some of the cases in which clients might have personal
reasons for pursuing one course of conduct, their lawyers may have
personal reasons for pursuing another—for example, because lawyers
prefer saving a client to letting the client have his day in court. 156 Fur-
thermore, the rules that give lawyers discretion, or even more poign-
antly encourage lawyers, to advise clients coercively are most powerful
with respect to clients who are poor (and thus unable to change law-
yers), unsophisticated, and dependent. The professional codes them-
selves do little to guide lawyers on how they must exercise coercive
authority, nor do the codes reconcile that authority with the codes'
broader theories of representation.
CONCLUSION
The assumptions underlying the organizational blackmail rules
are that the rules will force lawyers to promote lawful behavior by
corporate clients. The assumption of the more general coercive provi-
sions in the professional codes , is that lawyers will use their -power to
temper the exercise of client autonomy by encouraging moral deci-
sion making by clients. This Article's analysis of the rules and lawyers'
incentives in implementing the rules, however, suggests that the real-
ity is likely to be far more fluid. 157 Lawyers have their own interests in
the exercise of coercive authority that may be inconsistent with, or
undermine, the code drafters' intent. At least sophisticated clients will
adjust their behavior to mitigate the lawyer's power over clients that
blackmail rules provide.
at 1119, 1122 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting); see also H. Richard Uviller, Calling the Shots: The
Allocation of Choice Between the Accused and Counsel in the Defense of a Criminal Case, 52 R1Y1.-
GERS L. REV. 719, 729-37 (2000) (discussing the Unabomber case). In so doing, they may
have saved his life.
156 CI Langevoort & Rasmussen, supra note 44, at 375 (stating that little if any serious
attention has been given to the possibility that self-serving behavior will occur consciously
or unconsciously in one of the most basic of the lawyer's roles, that of giving legal advice to
a client" and noting that lawyers may tend to overstate legal risk).
357 See Kim, supra note 92, at 1037 (arguing that "the ethical ecology is , , complex,"
that "filnside counsel are subject to situational pressures arising out of their multiple roles
as mere employees, faithful agents, and team players," and that "Sarbanes-Oxley does
nothing to mitigate those pressures").
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The existence of these dynamics also suggests that lawyers may
promote or support the adoption of some coercive rules for reasons
that do not align with the rules' substantive justifications. Each possi-
ble phrasing of the organizational blackmail provisions will benefit
one segment of the corporate bar over another. With respect to the
more general rules governing coercive authority of lawyers, most law-
yers' personal interests align in favor of discretionary provisions that
provide them with leeway to emphasize personal concerns. This con-
sensus, in part, helps explain the relative sparseness in the rule draft-
ing process of consideration of guidelines or specific limits on the ex-
ercise of discretion. 158
Consider this question: may a law firm, in its retainer agreement,
cede its discretion to disclose confidential information under a
confidentiality exception in exchange for a higher fee? Most profes-
sional responsibility academics would answer in the negative, arguing
that the discretion must at least be exercised and that it should be ex-
ercised in light of the public-regarding considerations that the codes
clearly intend to emphasize. 159 Some private lawyers, however, would
disagree and would view the rules simply as giving a "right" to lawyers
that they may exercise in their own interests if they see fit to do so. 16°
Particular kinds of lawyers, and lawyers with particular attitudes to-
wards legal practice, can benefit more than others from this charac-
terization of discretion.
155 Even if lawyers do not overtly sell their authority to disclose for a higher fee, firms
can produce the same result by developing a reputation for serving as ultra-aggressive cli-
ent-centered lawyers.
159 See, e.g., Levine, supra note 137, at 46 (proposing a deliberative model of exercising
professional discretion); Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Recorweptualizing Advocacy
Ethics, 74 GEO. WASIt. L. REV. 1, 54 (2005) (discussing the obligation of lawyers to in fact
exercise discretion); Green & Zacharias, supra note 137 (discussing the significance of
discretionary rules). Other academics, such as my colleague David McGowan, might con-
clude that lawyers could (or would) not be disciplined for failure to exercise their discre-
tion to disclose, but might be bound by fiduciary principles to implement the rules in the
best interests of their clients. See McGowan, supra note 12, at 1827 (arguing that permissive
disclosure rules allow lawyers not to disclose without cost to themselves, leaving them to
decide whether disclosure will create costs).
150 See McGowan, supra note 12, at 1825 n.I (suggesting that there is no obligation of
lawyers to exercise discretion in a particular way, or even to exercise discretion). The
drafters of the new California future crime confidentiality exception have provided fodder
for proponents of the proposition that grants of discretion to lawyers are absolute by in-
cluding a provision that lawyers may never be deemed to have violated the rule by failing
to disclose and at the same time adding a comment stating that lawyers are not stthject to
discipline for revealing information pursuant to the rule. CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 3-100(E) & discussion 1 5 (2004).
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Because client autonomy concerns and the desire to encourage
clients to trust and use lawyers are fundamental principles on which the
professional codes are based, the failure to define lawyers' coercive
authority is anomalous. The failure of the drafting process to contem-
plate definitions can, perhaps, be explained on public choice
grounds—that lawyers, as an interest group, have hijacked the drafting
process away from serious consideration of the rules' effects and of the
way lawyers arc likely to implement them. Future debates on such rules
should rely less on platitudes concerning the societal interests at stake
and more on how those interests are likely to be served.
